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Community Defense of UnionFree Status
By Michael A. Caldwell*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, the shift of industrialization southward towards
the Sunbelt has brought growing prosperity to many previously impoverished communities. Climate, new markets, and favorable tax environments have made previously agrarian communities attractive to northern
industries. The ample availability of nonunion labor in these communities
has obviously played a large part in their selection as sites for plant relocation. In these cities and towns, the fortuitously "dropped" union authorization card in a plant restroom, or a report that a guest in a local
motel has used a credit card issued to a labor union, will send ripples of
alarm throughout the community. Elaborate "Christmas tree" communication networks will spring into action like a community DEW line, passing the dread word rapidly from merchant to manager, from minister to
mayor, that "the union is in town."
Most communities will greet this announcement with the enthusiasm of
Atlantans awaiting General Sherman. What the leaders and members of
the communities actually do about it often varies. Some will watch passively, but anxiously, as events unfold, fearful of attracting interest of
union organizers to their own companies. Others will want to ally themselves with the target employer in a common defense of their community's "union-free" status, in a way reminiscent of their agricultural forebears defending their crops from clouds of swarming locusts.'
* Partner in the firm of Arfkin, Caldwell, Horton & Steckel, Atlanta, Georgia. Catholic
University, Washington, D.C., (B.A., 1968; J.D., 1971). Member of the State Bars of Georgia,
Maryland and District of Columbia.
1. See, e.g., Fulton v. Emerson Electric Co., 420 F,2d 527 (5th Cir. 1969) (coercive newspaper article; beatings of pro union employees and organizers by fellow employees and
townspeople; acquiescence by police); Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir.
1969) (coercive threats by town mayor to employees during organizing campaign); Wooten v.
Ohler, 303 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (sheriff prevented peaceful picketing); NLRB v. Bibb
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Unfortunately, there has been no serious inquiry into the legitimacy of
the interests of the community in a labor dispute between an employer
and his employees. Additionally, there has been no systematic examination of the legal boundaries of the tactics utilized by neighboring businessmen and civic and political leaders in defense of their common
interests.
The purpose of this article will be to identify those interests that a
local community has in an individual employer's relationship with his employees and to articulate standards by which a community's defense of its
perceived interests can be judged. It will examine and criticize the traditional approaches and analyses employed by the National Labor Rela-

tions Board (NLRB or Board) and the courts in regulating third-party
conduct which may impact upon the relationship between an employercommunity member and his employees or their collective bargaining
representative.
II.
A.

NATURE OF THE INTERESTSI

The Community's and the Employer's Interests

The reaction of most business and political leaders in Dixie's bastions
of "union free" environments is highly predictable. Public officials and
private entrepreneurs have parallel and somewhat interdependent interests in keeping their communities free from encroachments of organized
labor.
Organized labor has not won overwhelming support from employers
and some community leaders in the forty-six years since the passage of
the Wagner Act.2 Public officials reflect their communities' interests in
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1951) (police surveillance of employees' union organizing
effort); NLRB v. Russell Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1951) (surveillance and coercion of
union organizers by police chief and officer); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (complaint alleged that textile company conspired with state and local officials); Textile Workers v. Cannon Mills Co., 98
L.R.R.M. 2271 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (surveillance and arrest of union employees); Starnes v.
City of Milledgeville, 15 L.R.R.M. 526 (No. 2517, Ga. Super. Ct. 1944) (town ordinance exacting $5000 license fee for union organizing).
t For a detailed development and support of the assertions in this subsection, see Appendix infra.
2. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 257, 73 Stat. 519. A
final amendment was the Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent
references will be to the "NLRA" or the "Act."
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economic growth and employment opportunities. The desire to attract
new enterprises and encourage expansion of existing businesses causes local political leaders to formulate a direct concern for the labor-management relationships within their communities. The states and communities
which exhibit weak support-occasionally open hostility-for unionization have experienced larger capital investment in recent years. Although
entrepreneurs consider many variables in making a plant location (or relocation) decision, the business climate of a community is a major factor
determining the choice. The community's attitude toward unionization is
a key consideration in evaluating the business climate. Since community
anti-unionism is viewed as a major plus-factor in evaluating the business
climate, it will have a direct and substantial effect on industrialization.'
Industrialization is beneficial to a community. Economic conditions improve for local government because of a decline in unemployment, an increase in commercial transactions and a rise in property values. Individuals in the community and in the local government are recipients of these
benefits. Those who become employed and those already in commerce experience rising personal incomes and property values. Economic growth is
truly beneficial to the entire community, including both individuals and
institutions. It is, therefore, reasonable for a community to adopt a posture that will be attractive to businessmen who will be the ones to make
the capital investment decision. This is a matter of practical political
4
economy rather than a matter of philosophy toward unions.
Entrepreneurs view unionization with disfavor. The establishment of a
union is thought to increase wages, limit the flexibility of management,
retard technical innovation, and reduce loyalty to the enterprise. These
results affect both the economic objectives of businessmen and the prerogatives of managements. The reduction of profits caused by rising labor
costs is sufficient to induce entrepreneurs to invest in communities that
disfavor unionization. The additional loss of prestige to management
through the restrictions imposed by hostile unions magnifies the attractiveness of nonunion communities for new investment. Although the community's orientation toward unionization is not the only criterion in the
investment decision, it is a major factor.5
The community's interest parallels the business interest. Political leaders can be expected to react negatively to the threat of unionization of
local business operations. Since the economic well-being of the community is at stake, the political officials undertake actions to protect those
interests. If an employer in the community becomes the target of a union3.
4.
5.

See text of Appendix and accompanying notes A5-A16 infra.
See text of Appendix and accompanying note A17 infra.
See text of Appendix and accompanying notes A2-A4 infra.
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ization attack, the community leaders should, and usually will, rally to
the defense of the targeted employer because the community's interest is
collateral with the employer's interest. In defending and pursuing the
community's interests, the public and private spokesmen may be better
serving the ultimate goals of our national labor policy than either the
union or the employer whose employees will be making the choice.
B.

The Legal Recognition of the Community's Interests

Neither the Wagner Act nor the Taft Hartley Act 7 contains any language indicating that their legislative architects consciously considered
the interests of the community members who might want to keep unions
out of their communities. The language of both statutes reveals a congressional concern for the effects of industrial strife upon "commerce," and
recites the constitutional foundation for the statutes' respective regulations of the employment relationship. It may be argued that Congress has
enunciated the community's interests in keeping the channels of commerce open by declaring that those interests lie not in discouraging collective bargaining by preventing union organization, but in encouraging
it. Proponents of this view argue that the community has no legitimate
interests in keeping itself union-free.
There are two problems with this argument. First, the assumption that
the intention of the national labor policy remains one of promoting union
growth is highly questionable in light of the restrictions placed upon unions in the Taft-Hartley Act. Under governmental policy prevailing between passage of the Wagner Act and the end of World War II, unions
flourished. Their membership expanded from three to fifteen million
members. In some industries, such as coal mining, construction, railroads,
and trucking, eighty percent of the work force was covered by union contracts. Labor had become, in a fourteen year period, the "largest, the
most powerful, and the most aggressive [movement] that the world has
ever seen; and the strongest unions. . . [had become] the most powerful
private economic organizations in the country."8 Thus, the immediate
mission of the Wagner Act, to encourage collective bargaining through
union organization, had been largely accomplished by 1947. But its overall purpose, to promote the free flow of commerce, was no longer being
advanced by the processes provided in that Act. As labor's muscle grew,
6. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) [hereinafter referred to as the "Wagner Act" or
"NLRA"].
7. Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) [hereinafter cited as the "Taft-Hartley Act" or

the "LMRA"].
8. C. MoIs,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
LENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 154 (1947)).

35

(1971)

(quoting S.

SLICHTER, THE CHAL-
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union leaders invoked their ultimate weapon, the strike, more often.
Twice during the critical period of World War II, John L. Lewis called his
United Mineworkers out on strike, crippling the vital coal and steel production.0 Immediately after the war, the nation was gripped by a series of
strikes which shut down seaports, auto assembly plants, steel mills, and
other important industries. The conversion of our commerce from a wartime footing to a peacetime economy was being significantly thwarted by
union activity.10 Thus, the constitutional purpose for the Wagner Act, the
promotion of the growth of commerce," had become frustrated by the
very means Congress had employed to accomplish it.
In the face of this stagnation of commerce, Congress perceived the
need for a readjustment of the means it had chosen to promote the constitutional end of the Wagner Act. The pendulum of economic power had,
in the view of many legislators,1 ' swung too far towards the union and
needed re-centering in order to achieve the balance between two equal
economic adversaries upon which the free flow of commerce was assumed
to depend. The method of the Wagner Act for achieving economic equality between the opponents was replaced by that of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which removed the artifical governmental props to the growth of union
power that had been provided by the earlier statute.13 Rather than promoting union organization, Congress determined, federal labor policy
would henceforth be neutral.Employees would be guaranteed the right to
refrain from union organization or concerted activity, along with the right
(previously guaranteed in the Wagner Act) to join in such activities.1 4
States were empowered to outlaw compulsory unionism.1 5 Both employ9.

MORRIS,supra note 8, at 36.

10. Id.
11. This purpose, which was embodied in the language of the Act, seems to have been
designed "primarily to give the Act a jurisdictional basis under the Commerce Clause."
MORRIS, supra note 8, at 27 n.9.
12. Senator Ball (R. Minn.) was one of the Wagner Act's most strident critics, and one of
the most active advocates for change. He presented four separate bills, one of which, S. 360,
became the skeleton for Title I of the Taft-Hartley Act; See Reilly, The Legislative History
of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 285, 289-91 (1960).
13. See generally Reilly, supra note 12, at 287-91.
14. Section 7 of the Act was amended to read:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976).
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ees and employers were thereafter guaranteed protection from certain
union abuses of power,'" and employers would be guaranteed the right to
attempt to persuade employees to refrainfrom joining in union activities,
provided such persuasion was exercised in a noncoercive fashion.17 The
assumption that our national labor policy is one of encouraging union
growth and collective bargaining is historically inaccurate, ignoring, as it
must, the background of the Taft-Hartley Act."8
The second problem with the argument against legal recognition of the
legitimate interests of a community in remaining "union-free" is its definition of community. Whether the national labor policy is one of encouragement, discouragement, or neutrality towards union organization, the
individual community's interests are separate. The national policy focuses
upon the "public interest" or those interests of the "national community," a somewhat amorphous and indefinable intellectual construct. The
term "community" as utilized in this article is intended to define a distinct political and economic entity, such as a village, town, city, or county.
Thus, the term "community interest" herein refers to the collective interests of the civic, political, public, private and commercial establishments
of those locales.
It is this community in which the greatest potential for economic advantage or disadvantage resulting from employees' organizational choices
lies. As demonstrated earlier, unionization of one employer can affect all
others by discouraging the investment of additional capital in that community which must aggressively compete with many others for the location of new plants or expansion of existing facilities in order to maintain
and improve its economic base.
There is precedent for recognizing the interest of the community in
keeping and attracting new businesses. Ironically, it can be found in three
Senate bills which were introduced during the Ninety-Sixth Congress
with commonly stated aims of controlling or limiting the ability of an
investor to remove an existing facility from a community.' The bills were
submitted by Senators Riegle (Michigan),20 Williams (New Jersey), 21 and
Metzenbaum (Ohio) 322-all
of whom are members of the "Northeast-Mid16. Id. at § 158(b).
17.

Id. at

§

158(c).

18. Proponents of this view continue to refer to this as the "slave labor law" or "right-towork-for-less" law. See H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY
389 (1950); see generally MORRIS, supra note 8, at 45-58.
19. National Employment Priorities Act of 1979, S. 1608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
Employee Protection and Community Stabilization Act of 1979, S. 1609, 96th Cong., 1st
Seas. (1979); Employment Maintenance Act of 1980, S.2400, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980).
20. S. 1608, supra note 19.
21.
22.

S. 1609, supra note 19.
S. 2400, supra note 19.
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west Senate Coalition," which seeks to influence federal policies affecting
that region of the nation. The findings of the bills reflect an awareness in
the Congress that business investment location issues are matters of legitimate governmental and community concern.' 8 None of the bills actually
reached the floor of the Senate (and it is doubtful that they will see passage in the more conservative Ninety-Seventh Congress). It is significant,
however, that each bill recognized an interest, as well as a correlative
"right" of the local community in which a business exists to protect that
interest in maintaining the continuity of that employing establishment.
The bills provided that, when the community's right to keep a business
collides with the private employer's entrepreneurial right to close or relocate his business, certain rights should accrue to the community and certain duties to the investors, in order to minimize the harmful impact of
the investment decision." It may thus be argued, a fortiori, that if a community has an interest and a right to protect the continuity of its employing facility, it likewise has a similar interest and right to attract new businesses, since the economic and social repercussions of capital investment
decisions are matters of vital community interest.
23. S. 1609, § 2(a)(1), supra note 19; Hearings on S. 1609 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 4 (1980). Similar findings were contained in the other bills. For example, Senator Williams' bill, S. 1609, contained the following "Declarations of Findings and Purposes":
The closing of establishments of business concerns causes irreparable social and
economic harm to employees, local communities, and the Nation, and should be
prevented whenever possible by strengthening local initiative and responsibility,
and by providing assistance to individuals and communities to use their own
resources.
Id.
Its stated purposes were:
(1) To provide communities and employees with adequate notices of decisions by
business concerns to terminate or tranfer operations of establishments in order to
permit individuals and communities affected time to develop a strategy to minimize the impact of that decision;
(2) To save jobs and stabilize communities through a program which will facilitate
employee or employee-community ownership and control of establishments which
would otherwise shut down;
(3) To recognize that whenever continued operation of an establishment by an
employee or an employee-community group is not a viable solution, business concerns have a responsibility to the affected employees to alleviate the social and
economic costs which result from the decision to terminate or transfer operations.
Id.
Likewise, Senator Metzenbaum's bill, S. 2400, stated as its purpose: "[T]o avert or minimize the harmful economic and social effects of unemployment on employees and on local
governments caused when business concerns undertake changes of operations." S. 2400 at §
2(b), 126 CONG. REc. S. 2323 (1980).
24. S. 1609 at § 4, for example, would have provided for advance notice and an opportunity for employees, with federal assistance, to purchase the facility.
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This inchoate interest of the community is somewhat analogous to the
"good will" of a business concern. "Good will" has long been considered
to be an interest cognizable at law,' 5 giving rise to certain correlative
rights, including, inter alia, the right to transfer the interest as an item of
value along with the sale of a business, and the right to legal protection
from tortious injury to or misappropriation of the good will."
The extent of the legal protection that a community has when it seeks
to enhance its "good will" or attractiveness to capital investment for
plant location by maintaining a "union-free" labor climate is not set forth
in either the Wagner Act or the Taft-Hartley Act. Therefore, to arrive at
a standard by which the community's actions in pursuit of this interest
might be judged, it will be necessary to examine the source of and limits
to the employer's right to resist unionization of his own employees.

III. THE DEFENSE OF THE INTERESTS
A.

The Targeted Employer's Right to Resist

As significant as the interests of the business and public members of
the surrounding community are, they have been ascribed very little recognition as such by the Board, the courts, or the Congress. They must be
found through analysis of, and through contrast with, those of the
"targeted employer."
The Wagner Act afforded scant recognition to the rights of any party
other than the employee and the union seeking his vote.' 7 Section 7 of the
Wagner Act was completely devoid of guarantees of rights to communities, or even to the employer whose enterprise would be most directly
affected by the employees' decisions. That section provided: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. .... I's
That the Wagner Act was notable for the imbalance of its approach to
the labor-management fray is hardly surprising. Viewed against the his25. See, e.g., 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA OP GA. LAW 401-02 (1974).
26. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN § 106-106 (1968); Gordy v. Dunwood, 209 Ga. 627, 74 S.E. 2d
886 (1953); Kay Jewelry Co. v. Kapiloff, 204 Ga. 209, 49 S.E. 2d 19 (1948).
27. The Senate Bill, S. 1958, which ultimately became the Wagner Act, was entitled "A
Bill to promote equality of bargaining power between employers and employees, to diminish
the causes of labor disputes, to create a National Labor Relations Board, and for other
purposes" (emphasis added). S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1295 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HisT. NLRA].
28. 29 U.S.C. at § 157.

19811

COMMUNITY DEFENSE OF UNION

687

torical backdrop of its legislative context, the Act may even be seen as a
comparatively modest approach. The collapse of the domestic and international economic orders following the debacle of 1929 provoked far more
radical responses in other nations. Confidence of the middle and laboring
classes in the welfare capitalism of the preceding decade was almost completely eroded as a result of the crash. To these people, both the rhetoric
and the objectives of the then-foundering labor movement took on new
appeal. The economic philosophy of John Maynard Keynes, placing its
heaviest emphasis upon the redistribution of wealth through mass
purchasing power and consumption resulting from direct governmental
intervention in the economy, was growing increasingly popular.3 9 The voluntaristic approach of the National Industrial Recovery Act 0 with its
codes of fair competition had failed when it met with the stiff and effective opposition of industrial leaders.3 1 The resultant polarization of business and labor helped to create a climate in Congress that was compatible
with the social engineering designs of Senator Robert Wagner. 2 Ever a
visionary, Wagner saw his bill as "an affirmative vehicle" for economic
and social progress3 3 with "freedom and dignity" for workers as a primary
goal. 3 4 To achieve this freedom and dignity for the masses, Wagner reasoned, the rights of employers and othbrs would have to be somewhat
subordinated to those of the workers until the desired equality of bargaining power was accomplished. Employers' previously unfettered discretion when making decisions concerning their enterprises and their employees would, therefore, need to be circumscribed by a regulatory
scheme that placed the employees' decision to organize at the pinnacle of
the value hierarchy.
The absence of guarantees of employer rights (or derivatively, of the
rights of other "outside" employers within the community) proceeded
from the congressional perception that employers already had sufficient
amounts of inherent economic power to make parallel guarantees of their
rights unnecessary.38 Thus, Congress consciously neglected to include
29.

A. Cox & D.

BOK, LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS

(6th Ed., 1965).

30. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
31. Cox & BOK, supra note 29, at 117-18.
32. Wagner's Bill was privately opposed by President Roosevelt. It did not receive
Roosevelt's public support until after Senate passage and its virtual guarantee of passage in
the House was assured. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 26-27.
33. See Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 199, 218 (1960).
34. 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935) (remarks of Sen. Wagner).
35. Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 79 CONG.
REC. 5425 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGis. HIST. NLRA, at 2651-52 (remarks of Rep. Biddle).
There was no pretense that the Act treated the parties equally. See 79 CONG. REC. 9700-01,
reprinted in 2 LEGiS. HIST. NLRA, at 3155-56 (remarks of Rep. Blanton).
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36

While the Wagner Act made no mention of the rights of employers, it
did not purport to abolish totally those rights in its attempt to add
strength to the union movement in order to make organized labor a more
equal competitor with management forces in the economic tilt. Rather,
the framers of the Act envisioned that when the employees' rights to selforganize collided with the private property rights of employers-and with
their inherent economic power to protect those rights-the power of the
federal government would intervene on the side of the employee.
The earliest decisions of the Board and the courts were premised upon
the view that the interest of an employer in the outcome of an employee's
decision on union organization was simply not sufficient to warrant exposing employees to the potential for coercion, which was inherent in an employer's statements in opposition to unions.0 7 Thus the Board enforced a
neutrality policy upon employers whose own employees were engaged in
organizational efforts." It followed, therefore, that if the targeted employer had no interest in (or right to address) the issue, employers whose
interests were less directly involved certainly had none.
The "interest" of a community in the organizational decision of a
targeted employer's employee was usually described as a fear of cessation
of the employer's operations."9 When the economy of a town was particularly dependent upon a single employing enterprise, the Board recognized
that, in the face of an organizing drive, this fear would be heightened.4 0
The Board did not examine the legitimacy of the fear; nor did it consider
whether other community members had any independent vested rights of
their own, distinct from those of the targeted employer, in continuing to
attract new industry to their community. Rather, the Board approached
the community's predictable hostility to union "invaders" as one of the
"susceptibilities of the community"' which a targeted employer must
36. See H.R. 6187, 74th Cong., 1st Seas. § 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGIs. HIST. NLRA, at
2448-49; S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEGis. HIST. NLRA, at
2420.
37. See NLRB v. Falk Corp., 102 F.2d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 1939); NLRB, AN OutLiN OF
LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES 292-93 (1974). But see NLRB v. Ford Motor
Co., 114 F.2d 905, 913 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 689 (1941); Cox & BOK, supra
note 29, at 170; Platt, Free Speech Under the National Labor Relations Act, 55 L.R.R.M.
105, 105-06 (1964); Koretz, Employer Interference With Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Riv. 399 (1960).
38. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 732, 748, 5 L.R.R.M. 536 (1940); Ford Motor
Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 4 L.R.R.M. 438 (1939), enforced, 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940).
39. See, e.g., International Shoe Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 728, 754, 4 L.R.R.M. 188, 191 (1939)),
enforcement denied, 116 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1940).
40. Id.; Elkland Leather Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 519, 530, 2 L.R.R.M. 490, 493-94 (1938), enforced, 114 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
41. 12 N.L.R.B. at 754-55, 4 L.R.R.M. at 191.
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take into account when making even facially neutral statements about a
union.
Typical of the Board's approach during this period was the case of Elkland Leather Co.,4 2 in which the Board held the targeted employer liable
not only for his own anti-union statements, but also for an anti-union
campaign undertaken by public and private citizens of the borough of
Elkland, Pennsylvania. Many of those citizens were not employed by the
company, and others were employed only as rank and file employees. The
employer's tannery was "practically the borough's only industry,' 4" its
payroll the town's "lifeblood."
Additionally, many of the town's civic
and political leaders were members of the plant's management, and other
business leaders were financially dependent in one way or another upon
45
the tannery.
Shortly after the constitutionality of the Wagner Act had been upheld
by the Supreme Court,'46 the tannery manager instructed all of his foremen to avoid any interference with the organizational activity of employees, but to inform him of any indication of organizing so that he could
"take care of the situation personally.' ' 7 Not long after the neutrality
policy was established, the C.I.O. initiated an organizing drive at the tannery and sent an officer to conduct the campaign. When the plant manager became aware of the activity, he had a printed statement attached to
each employee's paycheck stating:
"You are under no obligation to join any union and cannot be forced to
do so as this tannery will always operate as an open shop.
This company will deal individually with any employee that wishes to
do so at any time.
Elkland Leather Co., Inc.""
After the Company issued the seemingly innocuous statement, the union
organizers found it difficult to obtain a meeting place. They were refused
the use of both the public school auditorium and the private hall customarily used for public meetings. When they scheduled a mass meeting in a
42. 8 N.L.R.B. 519, 2 L.R.R.M. 490 (1938), enforced, 114 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 705 (1940).
43. Id. at 524, 2 L.R.R.M. at 492.
44. Id.
45. The local bank carried a "substantial account" of the company. The newspaper handled 90% of the employer's job printing. The tax collector/justice of the peace collected the
borough occupational taxes assessed against employees and commercial bills owed by them
from the employer. Id. at 525, 2 L.R.R.M. at 492.
46. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. See MoRRIs, supra note 8, at 30-31.
47. 8 N.L.R.B. at 526, 2 L.R.R.M. at 492.
48. Id.
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public park, they learned, on the eve of the meeting, of a plot to cause a
riot and to place the blame upon the union. Prudently, they held the
meeting out of town. Later, several tannery employees initiated an attempt to form a company union, telling their co-signers that the effort
4
was in order to keep the plant running. 9
At about the same time, the publisher of the town newspaper prepared
an anti-C.I.O. manifesto. The publisher (at his own expense) printed several hundred copies, mailing them to all of the post office boxes in the
town. The manifesto set forth the advantages of a local or company union
over a C.I.O. affiliate. It contained the usual rhetoric about the union's
interest in dues and assessments. Finally, it stated:
What if the tannery should shut down permanently? The result would
be a calamity to every person who owns a dollar's worth of property in
Elkland. And from a reliable source, it is understood that the tannery
will shut down before the demands of the C.I.O. will be accepted....
Before workers align with the movement on foot that may result in
disaster to every proberty owner or married man with family, they
should consider the existing situation thoroughly.
In this town that depends solely upon the operation of an industry
employing upwards to a thousand men, a shutdown will be disastrous,
and if such occurs Elkland will become just another ghost town, a wide
place in the road that once boasted the largest sole leather tannery on
50
earth.
Other townspeople got on the anti-C.I.O. bandwagon. The union organizers were literally run out of town by a group comprised of employees
and non-employees alike who threatened to beat them. The town's two
policemen beat a hasty retreat and disappeared. The organizers' departing car was followed by a convoy of twenty other automobiles. The borough counsel (the town's only attorney), who was not employed by the
company, chaired the meetings of employees supporting the company
union and drafted a "loyalty petition" for the employees to sign. The local tax collector had withdrawal forms printed up at his own expense and
distributed them to employees. An ad hoc committee of the business and
professional men was established to help the town's police chief maintain
order during a strike that had been called by the C.I.O. organizers.
The Board found that the drive had been frustrated in part by the general anti-union campaign in the town, and it held the company liable for
interference and restraint of the employees' section 7 rights. The keys to
its finding were the employees' paycheck stuffers, announcing the prefer49. The petition was circulated during employees' working time with the acquiescence of
several foremen. Id. at 528, 2 L.R.R.M. at 492.
50. Id. at 529-30, 2 L.R.R.M. at 492.
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ence for individual bargaining, s and the employer's failure to halt the
town campaign by allaying the community's fear that the plant would
close. 52
Thus, the earliest decisions under the Wagner Act reveal that the
Board and the courts approached the test of the community's expressions
in pursuit of its interests in a union representation question as if those
interests did not exist. Since the community's opinions were usually arrayed along the same lines as those of the targeted employer, their separate interests, arising from different exigencies, were treated as if they
were identical with, rather than distinct from, those of the targeted employers.58 It simply never occurred either to the Board or to most of the
courts that though the targeted employers and the community's immediate aims in an anti-union effort might be common, the ultimate sources of
those interests that each was pursuing in that effort were distinguishable.
In denying the rights of the targeted employer actively to oppose union
organization of his employees, and in ignoring the distinction between his
interests and those of non-parties within the community, they virtually
obliterated the legal significance of the community's interests and its correlative rights.
B. The Evolution of Free Speech and Recognition of Employer
Interests.
The Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.," required that the Board sharply readjust its analysis of the rights and interests of the parties to a representation contest when it held that the Board
must recognize the employer's first amendment right of free speech in
51. The stuffer declared the employer's preference for individual bargaining. It was, said
the Board, "[typical of) statements of policy [which] are ordinarily made by employers who
are hostile towards unions and who seek to avoid dealing with them.
Id. at 534, 2
L.R.R.M. at 493.
52. The Board held the employer had a duty to inform the community:
[Tihat the discontinuance of [part of the operation) was not due to its hostility
towards the Union, that its employees had a right to self-organization, and that it
did not desire the use of intimidation to break up the Union. That is the least [the
Company] could have done if its intentions had not been to create a situation
stimulating anti-union activity.
Id. at 535, 2 L.R.R.M. at 493.
53. See Sun Tent-Luebbert Co., 37 N.L.R.B. 50, 9 L.R.R.M. 207, modified, 151 F.2d 483
(9th Cir. 1945); Merit Clothing Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 1201, 8 L.R.R.M. 118 (1941); Ohio Fuel Gas
Co., 28 N.L.R.B. 667, 7 L.R.R.M. 145 (1940); International Shoe Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 728, 4
L.R.R.M. 188 (1939), enforcement denied, 116 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1940); Regal Shirt Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 567, 1-A L.R.R.M. 349 (1937); Brown Shoe Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 803, 1 L.R.R.M. 78
(1936).
54. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
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that contest. In so doing, the court was' adopting the line of reasoning
that had been followed earlier by the Sixth Circuit in Ford Motor Co. v.
NLRB55
The Sixth Circuit in Ford Motor denied enforcement to that portion of
a Board order that prohibited Ford from: "Interfering with, restraining,
or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by circulating, distributing, or otherwise disseminating
among its employees statements or propaganda which disparages or criticizes labor organizations or which advises its employees not to join such
organizations. . . ."51 That order resulted from a controversy which arose
after Ford's distribution of two pamphlets to its employees: the first an
attack on the U.A.W. in unflattering terms; and the second a pamphlet in
which Henry Ford gave his views on labor relations. The court found that
neither writing contained any threat of discharge, and that in fact Ford
himself specifically denied any intention to prevent his employees from
joining unions. The court went on to question the continuing validity of
the assumption that an employer's expression of an adverse opinion
about unions was necessarily coercive because of the
peculiar dependence
7
of the employee in the employment relationship.5
Granting the legitimacy of the opposing interests of both the employee
and the employer, the court grappled with the balance of rights between
them, noting:
[F]reedom of speech guaranteed without exception to all, is the more
fundamental right here involved ....
Without it the very right which
the Board seeks to protect by its cease and desist order, the right to
organize, to seek converts to unionism and collective bargaining, itself
would be of little value ....
Unless the right of free speech is enjoyed by
employers as well as by employees, the guaranty of the First Amendment
is futile, for it is fundamental that the basic rights guaranteed by the
Constitution belong equally to every person."
The Supreme Court in Virginia Electric held that neither the Act nor
the Board's order enjoined the employer from expressing its view on labor
policy or problems. "The sanctions of the Act," it said, "are imposed not
in punishment of the employer but for the protection of the employees.
The employer in this case is as free now as ever to take any side it may

55. 114 F.2d 905 (6th Cir. 1940).
56. Ford Motor Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 346, 409, 4 L.R.R.M. 438, 445 (1939).
57. See Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 84 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1936), afl'd, 300 U.S.
515 (1937); Comment, Restrictions on Employer's Right of Free Speech During Organizing
Campaigns and Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 40, 44 (1968).
58. 114 F.2d at 914-15 (quoting Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800, 804
(6th Cir. 1940)).
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choose on this controversial issue."'" The courts in both Ford Motor and
Virginia Electric thus implicitly recognized that an employer also has a
cognizable interest with regard to his employees' representation choices,
an interest which is legally sufficient to place his statements in pursuit of
that interest within the ambit of the first amendment.
Ford Motor and Virginia Electric are consistent with the Supreme
Court's recognition, announced in Thornhill v. Alabama,60 that "[L]abor
relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. Free discussion
concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes
appears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the
processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society." 61
Although Thornhill involved a conviction of a union organizing picketer under an Alabama statute forbidding such picketing, the case applies
with equal force to governmental restriction of the rights of anti-union
adherents to express their views in pursuit of what they perceive as their
interests. While it is true, as the Court repeated in Thornhill, that the
government has the right to "set the limits of permissibile contest open to
industrial combatants," 6. it has no right to disqualify one of the "combatants" from partaking in the fray, whether he is the targeted employer or
another member of the community concerned about the outcome of the
organizational issue. s The "free discussion concerning the conditions in
industry and the.causes of labor disputes"" which is so necessary to the
effective and intelligent use of the Board's election machinery by employees should not exclude the espousal of views by so-called "outsiders" on
the issue, since those individuals also possess legitimate interests in the
outcome which employees may consider when making their decision on
the issue.
C.

Section 8(c): The Protections (And Limits) of Free Speech

Congress codified the protection of employer free speech in 1947 when
it passed section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute
59. 314 U.S. at 477.
60. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
61. Id. at 104.
62. Id. See also NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241
(1939).
63. See also NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 768 (1943); compare NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941), in
which Judge Hand noted: "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition .
64. 310 U.S. at 103.
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or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit." 65 This provision sparked considerable debate in both
Houses of Congress regarding both the necessity for such statutory protection and the scope of any protection which would actually be afforded.
To understand the debate, it is helpful to recall that the Board and court
decisions vacillated on free speech questions during the interim period
between the announcement of the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia
Electric and the adoption of section 8(c)." Perturbed by these strained
findings of illegality of otherwise uncoercive speech, Congress, not surprisingly, determined that
there was a need for legislative protection of
7
the employer's rights.

In the Congressional debate on section 8(c), two themes emerged: that
Congress urgently wanted to halt the erosion of the protections to employer free speech that had been pronounced by the Supreme Court in
Virginia Electric, and that only speech which in itself threatened a reprisal or promised a benefit in order to influence employee choice was to be
considered an unfair labor practice." Many observers of the controversy
65. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
66. See, e.g., Clark Brothers Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 808, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360, 1361 (1946)
(Member Reilly, dissenting), enforced, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947); Goodall Co., 68 N.L.R.B.
252, 18 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1946); Monumental Life Ins. Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 244, 17 L.R.R.M. 437
(1946), enforced, 162 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1947).
67. Two different versions of the "Free Speech Amendment" were submitted in the
House and Senate. In the House version of the bill, H.R. 3020, the language was:
Nothwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act:
(1) Expressing any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form, if it does not by
its own terms threaten force or economic reprisal.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1947) (as reported), reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 56 (1948) (hereinafter
cited as LEGis. HIST. LMRAJ.
The Senate bill, S.B. 1126, stated: "The Board shall not base any finding of unfair labor
practices upon any statement of views or arguments, either written or oral, if such statement
contains under all circumstances no threat, express or implied, of reprisal or force, or offer,
express or implied, of benefit." S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(c) (1947) (as reported),
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST. LMRA, at 114.
The Senate version was strengthened by an amendment which added to the bill's language (after the word "benefit"):
"Provided that no language or provision of this section is intended to nor shall it
be construed or administered so as to abridge or interfere with the right of either
employers or employees to freedom of speech as guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
H.R. 3020 at § 8(c) (as passed Senate), reprinted in 1 LEGis. HIST. LMRA, at 242.
68. See 93 CONG. REc. 6601 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST. LMRA, at 1540-41 (Sen.
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consider the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the free
speech provision to be confusing. Contrary to some suggestions, 9 however, this section was intended to do more than "freeze that rule [of Virginia Electric] into law itself, rather than to leave employers dependent
upon future decisions, as Senator Taft suggested in the Senate debate.7 0
Nor was it merely a "broad codification of the rule laid down by the Supreme Court, followed in the main by the Board and the court during the
interval between Virginia Electric and the Taft-Hartley amendments, 7 1
as other authors have suggested.
It appears that Congress wanted to go farther than merely recognizing
the employer's right to voice his objections to the union. It is obvious that
in enacting section 8(c), Congress, in reaction to the Board's excesses in
restricting employer free speech, wanted to loosen once and for all the
unjustified gag that the Board and courts had placed upon employer's
expressions in defense of their interests in employee representational
choices. Rejected was the view that the free speech rights of employer
and union should be treated differently because of the employer-em72
ployee relationship.
Since the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Free Speech Amendments, the
task of the Board and the courts has been to define the boundaries of the
protection of free speech. The "most troublesome element" concerned the
distinction between unlawful threats and lawful prophecies of the probaTaft). Senator Pepper (D. Fla.) pointed out in opposition to the Bill:
[Firee speech . . . does not mean the right to intimidate or coerce or otherwise
improperly to influence employees in the exercise of their democratic rights to join
a union or not to join a union. . . . Fundamentally, and speaking for myself, I
believe that an employer has no more right to try to influence his employees in
[joining or not joining] a labor union than he has to intimidate them from joining
a church or fraternal organization ...
93 CONG. REc. 5118 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIs. HIST. LMRA, at 1460.
69. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L.
RV. 274 (1948); Wollett and Rowen, Employer Speech and Related Issues, 16 OHIO ST. L.J.
380, 384 (1955); Platt, Free Speech Under the National Labor Relations Act, 55 L.R.R.M.
105, 107 (1964).
70. 93 CONG. REC. 3953 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIs. HIST. LMRA, at 1011.
71. See Platt, supra note 69, at 107.
72. This view was discarded by the Sixth Circuit in Ford Motor, 114 F.2d at 914-15. In
opposing the House "Free Speech Amendment," Representative Price noted:
The Bill ignores ... [the fact] that employees who are dependent for their bread
and butter on the job which [is their employer's] to give or withhold are sensible
and responsible even to subtle suggestions of the employer's desires, and that the
employers need do not more than hint to assure that employees will obey them. Is
a rule of conduct which is based upon disregard of this elementary fact, fair and
equitable? Does it protect the rights of individual workers?
93 CONG. REc. 3521 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGis. HIsT. LMRA, at 681.
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ble effects of unionization upon employees.71 The need for the distinction
between the two concepts was iterated by the Board in Chicopee Manufacturing Corp.,74 in which the Board stated: "A prophecy that unionization might ultimately lead to a loss of employment is not coercive where
there is no threat that the employer will use its economic power to make
its prophecy come true."7
The most serious threats or predictions concern three basic themes:
statements concerning the potential for plant closure, "bargaining from
scratch," and statements concerning the potential for less-definable "serious harm." The distinction between a threat and a prediction of plant
closure was drawn by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.,7 6 in which the court considered an employer's series of predictions
concerning the potential for plant closing and strikes during a union campaign. The themes conveyed in the employer's campaign were:
that the Company was in a precarious financial position; that the 'strikehappy' union would in all likelihood have to obtain its potentially unreasonable demands by striking, the probable result of which would be a
plant shutdown, as the past history of labor relations in the area indicated; and that the employees in
such a case would have great difficulty
77
finding employment elsewhere.
The company's contention was that these were lawful statements pro73. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 73. Commenting upon the distinction, Archibald Cox
stated: "An employer may not lawfully 'threaten' to reduce wages or close a plant if a union
is organized, but he may 'predict' that these things will happen." A. Cox, LAW AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 42-43 (1960). Derek Bok noted the trouble in distinguishing between "threats" and "predictions":
In principle, the policy was sound enough, for when the employer simply pointed
out the adverse consequences which might lawfully result from unionization he
provided the employees with information that was clearly pertinent to the decision they were called upon to make. In practice, however, the policy gave hostile
employers great leeway to indulge in dire predictions in order to dissuade the employees from supporting the union.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 38, 75 (1964).
74. 107 N.L.R.B. 106, 33 L.R.R.M. 1064 (1953).
75. Id. at 107. Compare Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 758 (6th Cir.
1965). (Employer predictions of serious harm resulting from union were found lawful by
court; predictions about adverse application of overtime policy were unlawful because the
employer can control policy. References to plant relocations that related to increasingly high
waste problem and delivery scheduling problems were lawful, while prediction that the company might move rather than meet union demands was unlawful since it depended on employer's choice.) See also NLRB v. Threads, Inc., 308 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1962); ACWA v.
NLRB, 365 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
76. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
77. Id. at 619.
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tected by section 8(c) because they were based upon facts; because each
statement taken separately contained no threats; and therefore the sum
of the parts could not be unlawful. The Supreme Court responded:
In this connection, we need go no further than to point out (1) that petitioner had no support for its basic assumption that the union, which had
not yet even presented any demands, would have to strike to be heard,
and that it admitted at the hearing that it had no basis for attributing
other plant closings in the area to unionism; and (2) that the Board has
often found that employees, who are particularly sensitive to rumors of
plant closings, take such hints as coercive threats rather than honest
forecasts. 7
The focus of the question in these cases is not upon the dictionary meaning of the words but upon: "What did the speaker intend and the listener
understand?"' The Court announced the following rule to be applied in
threat versus prediction cases:
[A]n employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general
views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular
union, so long as the communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.' He may even make a prediction as to the
precise effect he believes unionization will have on his company. In such
a case, however, the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of
objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable
consequences beyond his control. .

.

. If there is any implication that an

employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts, but a
threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and is
such without the protection of the First Amendment. We therefore agree
with the court below that '[c]onveyance of the employer's belief, even
though sincere, that unionization will or may result in the closing of the
plant is not a statement of fact unless, which is most improbable, the
eventuality of closing is capable of proof.

. .

.' As stated elsewhere an

employer is free only to tell 'what he reasonably believes will be the
likely economic consequences of unionization that are outside his control,' and' onot 'threats of economic reprisal to be taken solely on his own
volition. "

For those who argue that this vague standard is a distinction without difference, the Court warned that he who engages in "brinkmanship" must
be careful lest he "overstep and tumble [over] the brink."'
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 619-20 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 619, (quoting A. Cox, supra note 73, at 44).
395 U.S. at 618-19.
Id. at 620, (quoting Wassau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1967)).
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In determining where the "brink" is, the Board has sometimes tested
the facts of each case in a manner which appears to be a mechanical or
magic word approach. This is especially true in the "bargaining from
scratch" or "serious harm" statement cases. In each case, the Board
claims to examine the context of the situation in which the words were
used, ostensibly in order to derive the meaning of the words to the listeners. When the facts reveal a pattern of coercive conduct by the employer,
the Board will often conclude that the words were signals, intended to
convey, and in fact conveying, that the employer, of its own volition, will
retaliate for employees' union adherence. In finding that context, the
Board sometimes appears to be stretching our analytical credibility."
"Bargaining from scratch" statements of employers have frequently
been examined by using a "total context" approach. In Wagner Industrial Products Co.,Os for example, the Board found that the employer's
use of the term "bargaining from scratch" in a letter to employees was
not coercive since it did not occur in a context of contemporaneous behavior in which other unfair labor practices had occurred. In Campbell
Soup Co.," the employer who utilized the "bargaining from scratch" language did engage in contemporaneous acts of interference necessitating
an election rerun as well as an unfair labor practice remedy. However,
since the employer had also distributed a handout which indicated that
any loss of benefits to employees would derive from the possibility that
the union might bargain away some existing benefits in return for others,
rather than from any employer choice such as a regressive bargaining posture, the Board found that the "bargaining from scratch" stateinent was
permissible under section 8(c), rather than objectionable conduct." In
NLRB v. Interstate Engineering," the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Board that the "context" of the statements that the company would "bargain from scratch" furnished an unlawful meaning. There was within that
context "voluminous evidence of egregious unfair labor practices"8 7 even
82. See, e.g., Holly Farms Poultry Indus., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 952, 79 L.R.R.M. 1127, enforced in pertinent part, 470 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1972); Serv-Air, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 382, 63
L.R.R.M. 1270 (1966); Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1275, 64 L.R.R.M. 1164
(1967), enforcement denied in pertinent part, 398 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1968).
83. 170 N.L.R.B. 1413, 67 L.R.R.M. 1581 (1968).
84. 225 N.L.R.B. 222, 93 L.R.R.M. 1046 (1976).
85. Id. at 229, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1046. See also, Stumpf Motor Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 431, 432,
85 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1974); Computer Peripherals, Inc., 215 N.L.R.B. 293, 88 L.R.R.M. 1027
(1974).
86. 583 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 1088. The Company had disestablished and refused to recognize or bargain
with a legitimate employee-elected grievance committee; established and dominated another
such group; promised benefits to employees; and made numerous threats, including a plant
closure.
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though, as the court noted, the letters containing the language may well
have been protected by section 8(c) without those surrounding
circumstances.
A rule can thus be extracted from the Board and court decisions concerning licit predictions and illicit threats: employers will be held to have
violated the Act by threatening employees when their statements are
couched in terms of prophecies of dire consequences befalling employees
from employer choices resulting from the employees' choice of a bargaining agent. When the threat of harm is not specific, it will be examined
along with the factual context surrounding it, which context will be held
to place meaning upon the bare bones of the employer's actual words. In
these cases, the context will lead the Board and the courts to the likely
interpretation of the words that an employee would derive. When the
context evokes a coercive meaning, the statement, although otherwise
lawful and ambiguous, will be considered to go beyond the protection of
section 8(c). The Board sometimes appears ready to read a sinister meaning into any statement when the context includes substantial contemporaneous unfair labor practices occurring within weeks of the ambiguous
statement. But the courts have not been uniform in accepting the Board's
analysis. Unfortunately, neither the Board's nor the courts' decisions have
been entirely consistent in viewing the quantum of conduct or the seriousness of the conduct which will be required before an employer can be
found to have "overstepped the brink" of free speech permitted by section 8(c). Nevertheless, the treatment of the threats-versus-prediction
problem by the Board and the courts typifies the type of analysis that is
applied to all questions of coercive employer speeches in the unfair labor
practice case context.
D.

Election Cases and Free Speech

Shortly after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board announced
just how far it would let employers' freedom of speech insulate their
statements from any legal consequences. In General Shoe Corp." the
Board iterated the standard by which it would judge whether an employer's anti-union utterances, though cloaked with the protection of section 8(c), nevertheless trespassed upon the hallowed ground of employee
free choice guaranteed in representation elections by section 7 of the Act.
We do not subscribe to the view ... that the criteria applied ... in a
representation proceeding ... need necessarily be identical to those employed in testing whether an unfair labor practice was committed ....
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory
88.

77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
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in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly
ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.8"
Whether or not this standard is a realistic one,' 0 it has been applied by

the Board and accepted by the courts in such a manner that it is now
clear that the Board finds the threshold of challenge to conduct which
may interfere with the freedom of choice in an election a relatively low
standard which is far easier to cross than the higher standard required for
a finding that the same conduct amounted to an unfair labor practice.
The severity of the test for finding interference with an impending vote
as opposed to a finding of restraint and coercion violative of section

8(a)(1) has varied according to the makeup of the Board. Thus, during
the Eisenhower years the test was "eclipsed in favor of Section 8(c) as an
outer limit in election cases."' 91 However, the distinction between the test
to be applied in determining liability for section 8(a)(1) violations and
that to be used in testing for election interference was resurrected by the

Kennedy Board in Dal-Tex Optical Co.,' 2 and has been applied, more or
less consistently, ever since. As the Board stated in Dal-Tex:
[Clonduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) is a fortiori, conduct which interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice in an election.
This is so because the test of conduct which may interfere with the 'laboratory conditions' for an election is considerably more restrictive [of an
employer's conduct] than the test of conduct which amounts to interference, restraint or coercion which violates Section 8(a)(1).2

Even though an employer's statement contains, by its express terms or by

derivative implication, no threat or promise which could strip it of protection under section 8(c), it can nevertheless be found to have interfered

with employee organizational rights and thus require the direction of a
new election.
Illustrative of the dual standard applied to unfair labor practice cases
and representation cases is the decision of the Board in Florida-Texas

Freight, Inc." In that case the Board found objectionable conduct
89.
90.

Id. at 127, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340.
Derek Bok suggests that it is not. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under The National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38

(1964).
91. MoRRIs, supra note 8, at 78, citing National Furniture Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1, 40
L.R.R.M. 1442 (1957); Lux Clock Mfg. Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 1194, 36 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1955);

Esquire, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238, 33 L.R.R.M. 1367 (1954); American Laundry Mach. Co.,
107 N.L.R.B. 511, 33 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1953). These cases were overruled by Dal-Tex Optical
Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489, 1491 (1962).
92. 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962).

93.

Id. at 1786-87, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1492.

94.

230 N.L.R.B. 952, 95 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1977). This was an objections case rather than
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whereby unit employees became aware of the contents of a confidential
memorandum detailing plans to close the facility if the union won the
election. The employer could not be charged with responsibility for the
disclosure since the document had actually been pilfered from the employer's files, examined in an unauthorized manner, and disclosed to unit
employees by a fellow employee. The regional director ruled that the conduct was unobjectionable due to the absence of any link with the employer. The Board overruled the regional director, analogizing the situation to one in which third parties conduct massive campaigns to convey
the message that choosing the union will cause the employer to move or
shut down, thereby depriving employees of job opportunities."
Another example of the duality of standards can be found in the
Board's treatment of employer propaganda which contains material factual misrepresentations but which is devoid of express or implied
promises or threats. Such statements would fall within the ambit of section 8(c) even though they would trigger a rerun election under the
Board's Hollywood Ceramics rule." The dichotomy between the standards to be applied in election versus unfair labor practice cases is not
always clear. For example, in Mohawk Bedding Co., 97 the Board applied
the Gissel unfair labor practice test to employer campaign statements in
the context of an election objections case. Even with the allegedly higher
unfair labor practice standard as the test, the Board found that the employer had engaged in objectionable conduct. It relied upon the employer's repeated references to a former owner of the plant who had
closed the business after it had become unionized, references to the high
unemployment rate in the area, and references to other unionized plants
in the area which had closed or had moved away. The Board also looked
to the employer's speeches which highlighted the possibility that the
union would make high wage demands and urge restrictive, inefficient
and expensive work practices which could result in the company's becoming noncompetitive in a highly competitive textile industry. This situation, the employer noted, could force the plant to close. The Board found

an unfair labor practice case.
95. Id. at 952, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1426, citing Utica-Herbrand Tool Div. of Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1717, 1719, 55 L.R.R.M. 1223, 1225 (1964); James Lees & Sons Co., 130
N.L.R.B. 290, 291, 47 L.R.R.M. 1285, 1286 (1961).
96. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962). That rule requires that an election be set aside when there has been a material misrepresentation which
involves a substantial departure from the truth at a time which prevents the other parties
from making an effective reply. The misrepresentation must be of a kind of which the
speaker has special knowledge. And the employees must have a lack of independent knowledge on the subject. See Moims, supra note 8, at 91; General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619,
99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
97. 204 N.L.R.B. 277, 83 L.R.R.M. 1317 (1973).
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that these statements were a threat of a plant closure in retaliation for
employees' selection of a union, pointing out that the employer provided
employees with no cost comparison or financial data of any kind and thus
failed to base his implication of plant closure on any demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control (applying the Gissel test). Thus, it
ruled the employer transgressed the standard and engaged in objectionable conduct.
The problems with the Board's analysis are multiple. First, the employer predicated his "prediction" upon union demands, carefully couching his statements with "ifs"" and including a disclaimer of intent to
close the plant in his statements. Second, the Gissel test is inappropriate
in an election objections case in which according to the Board's General
Shoe doctrine, the section 8(c) protection of employer speech does not
apply. Finally, although the Board ostensibly applied the higher Gissel
standards for testing the employer's statements, it is apparent that it did
not adhere to them. Rather than utilizing a more sensitive test for employer pre-election conduct as Dal-Tex commands, the Board actually
lowered the threshold for a finding of an unlawful threat below the level
dictated by the Supreme Court in Gissel.s9 However, instead of issuing a
bargaining order, the Board called for a rerun election.10 0
The Board's treatment of strike predictions is likewise lacking in predictability. It is obvious that a strike is the union's most potent weapon
which, because of its two-edged nature, is usually closely controlled and
carefully wielded by responsible union leadership. An employer's control
over the calling of a strike is indirect at most. Therefore, employer predictions concerning strikes will most likely be received by employees more
critically and discerningly than employer predictions concerning plant
closure, over which the employer has direct control.
However, the Board's policy on employer's strike predictions during

98.

He said, for example:
If the union wins the election. . . and if in bargaining with us they really try to
make good on the fantastic figures mentioned in the leaflets, then we could all be
in for serious trouble. . . If our labor costs ever get out of hand, whether on
account of having a union or for any other reason, and if our ability to run this
plant was crippled by the kind of unreasonable work restrictions you find in some
Union contracts, then, under those circumstances, there would be a question as to
whether this company could remain in business here. I repeat, I am not threatening to close this plant if the Union wins the election ...
Id. at 278, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1318.
99. Chairman Miller dissented, finding no expressed or implied threats of reprisal or
material misrepresentations. Id. at 279, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1319.
100. Id. at 279, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1319. For other examples of the Board's inconsistent
approach to this area, compare General Elec. Wiring Devices, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 876, 74
L.R.R.M. 1224 (1970), with Louis Allis Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 433, 74 L.R.R.M. 1124 (1970).
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pre-election campaigns ignores this. As was stated in Boaz Spinning
Co.:101

In arguing against unionism, an employer is free to discuss rationally
the potency of strikes as a weapon ....

It is, however, a different matter

when the employer leads the employees to believe that they must strike
in order to get concessions ....

When an employer frames the issue of

whether or not the employees should vote for a union purely in terms of
what a strike might accomplish, he demonstrates an attitude of predetermination that bargaining itself will accomplish nothing ....

Policy con-

siderations dictate that employees should not be led to believe,1 0 before
voting, that their choice is simply between no union or striking. 2
Essential to the Board's finding was the view that remarks such as those
contained in the speeches amounted to virtual anticipatory refusals to
bargain. The Board found that the "total context" of the employer's campaign conveyed, through purveyance of a constant repetition of the theme
that strikes, bloodshed, and job and community disruptions could be the
only result of a vote for the union, such an anticipatory refusal. One must
wonder, however, how many mentions of strikes or their likelihood because of certain union strike histories, or of the consequences of strike,
will be permitted before the Board in applying its mysterious formula will
reach the forbidden sum.
The Board implied in Ideal Baking Co. 10 3 that the employer has an
affirmative duty to tell "its employees and their families that the selection of a collective-bargaining representative need not result in a strike,
violence, trouble, or loss of jobs, but could result in a collective-bargaining agreement."'" This raises the question of whether the employer is
obligated to tell both sides of all issues. Nowhere in the Act or in the
statements of the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel or any of its progeny has either party been required to state his opponent's case after stating his own. Each party in an election is assumed to be the captain of his
101. 177 N.L.R.B. 788, 71 L.R.R.M. 1506 (1969).
102. Id. at 789, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1508. The employer conjured up visions of strikes in two
pre-election speeches by relating detailed case histories of nine textile mills (one of which he
owned) that were closed after prolonged strikes. The details included strike by-products
such as plant closures, loss of jobs, replacements, loss of income, violence, bloodshed,' family
disruption. The reason for the closures, he asserted, was not because employees voted a
union in, but because the resulting strife and internal dissension made the employer unable
to compete. Id.
103. 143 N.L.R.B. 546, 53 L.R.R.M. 1270 (1963).
104. Id. at 552, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1272. But see dissenting opinions of Members Rogers and
Leedom, id. at 555, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1273. The Board found the employer's entire pre-election campaign to be both objectionable (and grounds for a rerun of the election) and a
violation of § 8(a)(1), because it was "intimidatory in nature" and intended to convey
threats of job loss and physical violence. Id. at 552, 53 L.R.R.M. at 1273.
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own argument, entitled to press it with as much force as he can muster.
As the Tenth Circuit noted in NLRB v. Sanitary Laundry, Inc.,105 it was
the intent of Congress "to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor
and management. And . . . cases involving speech are to be considered
against the background of a profound. . . commitment to the principle
that debate . . . should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ... ","
The court's decision, like that of the-Supreme Court in Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers,1 07 amounts to no less than judicial benediction of
the dialectic process of pre-election campaigning. But Board decisions
often evince a lack of appreciation for this vital principle.
The confusion that emanates from the Board's decisions in the election
case propaganda area persists. In Niagara Frontier Methodist Home,
Inc.,'"0 for example, the Board found unobjectionable statements in five
letters and one speech by a nursing home director that told employees of
the union's acknowledgement of a freeze in the reimbursement rates imposed by a state agency that was preventing nursing home employers
from making payments of increases due in union contracts. The employer's letters likewise told employees the following:
I believe you would be throwing your hard-earned money down the
drain.
... The Union would be powerless to change your wages at this
time ....
...The Union can make promises .... these promises are enticements. They are negotiable issues-wage controls remain in force
through control of reimbursement by the State....
...[Y]ou are fooling yourself if you think that getting the Union in
here is going to result in any immediate increase in your wages. Those
wage rates are fixed by the reimbursement plan of the State ... and we
are doing every thing we can to get more....
...You should know that you may be jeopardizing these benefits by
letting the Union in here .... They can negotiate away existing benefits
in order to get something they want.
...Remember that the only way a union can enforce its demands is

by calling a strike. 10 '

The Board found that these statements did not convey that the em105. 441 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1971).
106. Id. at 1370. The court rejected the Board's notion that the company's emphatic
repetition (in three letters) that a strike is the union's chief weapon, and that there were
immediate economic detriments inherent in a strike, warranted a rerun of the election. The
Board had found no single statement that was unlawful in itself. The "unlawfulness" was
the sum of the letters in the Board's mysterious mathematics.
107. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
108. 232 N.L.R.B. 384, 97 L.R.R.M. 1163 (1977).
109. Id. at 384-85, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1163-64.

1981]

COMMUNITY DEFENSE OF UNION

705

ployer would enter contract negotiations with a fixed, inflexible position,
or that a strike was inevitable. Rather, the Board found that this constituted a "reasonable expression of the Employer's view of the realities...
in light of the State's [reimbursement freeze]." 110 In contrast, shortly after this decision, the Board in Paoli Chair Co."' found an employer's
conduct to have exceeded the bounds of permissible campaigning when,
in response to a union statement that an employer cannot close or
threaten to close a plant, the employer agreed that the union was:
[p]robably right technically, but again, it's a half-truth, because I think
there was a case where somebody had a union voted in and they just shut
the plant down and they made them open it back up. But after you have
a union, my first job ...

was at a plant ...

that had been shut down for

more than a year with a lot of union trouble and a strike and later on
when I was President of the Huntingburg Furniture Company, we had a
plant that had so much strife ... and the production went down and we
were losing money and we just had to close the plant and the people lost
their jobs. So1 1 he's technically right but that just means immediately after
the election. '

He then told the employees:
The union can promise anything but only the Company can deliver. If
you vote for a union, and eventually we have to negotiate, I will abide by
the law. The law says we have to bargain in good faith and we will, but
the law says that I do not have to agree to anything that I do not feel is
in the best interest of the Company. .

.

. They're (the union) not going

to change one damn thing other than they're going to bargain and I'm
going to bargain in good faith and I am a tough damn bargainer. I would
not sit at the bargaining table. We got our professional bargainers to do

that....
I'm not saying that a strike is inevitable. But again, I say a strike is the
only way a union can try to force me to do something that I don't feel is
right for this Company. ...
Without a union, our policy has been to pay wages as high as we could
afford. That's what we have done. With a union we would pay as little as
we could bargain for and, I am telling you again, in bargaining the only
club they have is to strike ....

"I

Finally, he added this "gem" of persuasiveness as his finale: "If you can't
see that you have a lot to lose and nothing to gain by joining the union
then you are not as smart as I have been giving you credit for. Thank you.
110. Id. at 385, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1164.
111. 231 N.L.R.B. 539, 96 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1977).
112. Id. at 539, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1116.
113. Id.
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That's it."1" ' Every statement cited by the Board in reversing the election
was actually a lawful paraphrase of the employer's bargaining duties and
rights. Nowhere was it challenged that the facts concerning the plant closures and strikes were not true. This was not a part of a campaign replete
with "emphatic repetitions" of the theme of strike inevitability and plant
closure. Nevertheless, the mere description of the law relative to plant
closing as a "half truth," which though "technically correct" applied only
"immediately after the election," was sufficient to damn the entire election in the eyes of Chairman Fanning and Member Penello."15 In addition, Chairman Fanning emphasized the statement that the employees'
choice was to vote for the union and get "a lot to lose and nothing to
gain." Coupled with the statements that the employer was paying all that
it could afford and the other statements about the employer's tough bargaining stance conveyed the impression that a vote for the union was an
"exercise in futility."""
Paoli Chair and Niagara Frontierare difficult to harmonize with each
other. The potential for coercion appears more obvious in Niagara Frontier, in which the Board tolerated the employer's statements, than in
Paoli Chair.The Board emphasized that the State of New York did have
a reimbursement freeze that hampered the employer's financial ability to
grant wage increases. But truthfulness was not a defense for the employer
in Paoli Chair, who did not even say he would not grant wage increases
but only crowed, in language suggesting bravado rather than belligerence,
that he was a "tough damn bargainer." This position, which may indeed
convey the message to employees that collective bargaining is potentially
hazardous and that as a result of such negotiations employees might possibly wind up with fewer benefits after unionization than before, is a le1 17
gitimate one that has subsequently received Board approva.
Since the protection of section 8(c) does not include the statements of
employers when those statements have arguably interfered with elections
in such a way as to necessitate a rerun, the statements receive closer scrutiny by the Board, whose decisions in this area are afforded more deference by the courts. It is less likely that a Board decision in an objections
case will receive judicial review. The route to testing a Board representation case decision is long, arduous, and expensive. It requires the running
of a second election, a loss by the employer, certification by the Board
and subsequent employer refusal to bargain, a trial, and a finding by the

114. Id. He won the election by a slim margin of eight votes out of 205. Id. at 539 n.1, 96
L.R.R.M. at 1116.
115. Id. at 539, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1115. Member Walther, the third member, dissented.
116. Id. at 540-41, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1116.
117. See Coach & Equip. Sales Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 440, 441, 94 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1392
(1977). See also Host Int'l, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 348, 79 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1972).
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administrative law judge and Board against the employer on the refusal
to bargain, and finally a petition for review in a federal appellate court. 18
It is only in the appellate court that the employer can raise the impropriety of the Board's ruling in the first election. Few employers will spend
the money litigating the case to this point. Thus, the Board's decisions in
these cases are less likely to be closely examined by the appellate courts;
and it is less likely that the Board's adherence to the dictates of Congress
and the federal courts on these matters will be judged. Thus, insulated
somewhat from judicial scrutiny, the Board has embarked on an erratic
course in judging employers' pre-election campaign statements. It cannot
be predicted with a high degree of certitude how the Board will rule on
any employer statement, and the rationale for the Board's rulings is often
difficult to divine. Moreover there is an obvious double standard in judging the pre-election statements of employers and unions. This results perhaps from the Board's perceptions of the economic realities of the employer-employee relationship.
The Board would do well to heed the advice of the Second Circuit in
Luxuray, Division of Beaunit Corp. v. NLRB: 9 "It is primarily the responsibility of the employees, and not of the Board, to evaluate the merit
of competing propaganda. 'Congress did not intend the Board to act as a
censor of the reasonableness of statements by either party to a labor controversy . ." 0 An effective election process requires the vigorous participation of both employers and unions, if the employees' freedom of
choice is to be given its fullest meaning. The "informed state of mind"
upon which free choice is to be exercised requires that no view which is
relevant to the choice be artificially excluded from the voter's deliberations. "1 1 Congress intended to encourage rather than restrict the debate
about the issues dividing labor and management in elections in order to
enhance that "informed state of mind" in which the employee choice is
exercised. This intent is ill-served by the Board's super-sensitivity to the
opportunity for coercion, a mind-set which is about the only consistency
apparent from the Board's decisions in this area. With the advent of a
new administration, employers may once again hope to see in Board decisions on objection cases a resurrection of reverence for the principles em'

118.
NLRB,
NLRB,
1967).
119.
1967).
120.
121.
U.S. at

See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 477 (1964); Boaz Spinning Co. v.
439 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1971); Automation & Measurement Div., Bendix Corp. v.
400 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Ortronix, Inc., 380 F.2d 737, 739 (5th Cir.
447 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971); accord NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
447 F.2d at 117 (quoting 388 F.2d at 928-29).
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
770.
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.bodied in section 8(c). While it would be unwise to give total free reign to
any party in an election debate, at the very least the Board
should return
122
to what it said in Owens-Corning Fiber Glass Corp.:
Although attempting to establish ideal conditions insofar as possible, we
acknowledge that actual facts must be considered in light of realistic
standards of human conduct, and that elections must be appraised realistically and practically, and should not be judged against theoretically
ideal, but nevertheless artificial standards ....

[W]e are not unmindful

of the fact that the "laboratory" for election purposes is usually an industrial plant where vigorous campaigning and discussion normally take
place, and where isolated deviations from the above-mentioned standard
will sometimes arise,
notwithstanding the best directed effort to prevent
12
their occurrence.

IV.

THE "THIRD-PARTY PARTICIPANT"

This article first sought to define and examine the legitimacy of the
interests of persons within the community who are not directly involved
in a representation election but who are nonetheless directly affected by
its results. To derive a framework for positing the rights and legal obligations of those persons, it then examined the rights of party employers and
the legal perimeter of their freedom to express their opposition to union
representation of their employees.
In this part, cases will be examined in which the Board and the courts
have attempted to balance the rights of third parties with those of parties
in representation cases. It will analyze and critique the manner in which
the interests of the community have been accounted for, and regulated by
the Board and courts when community members have acted to keep their
community "union-free."
A.

Standards of Review

The conduct of non-party employers, and community members generally, has a less significant impact upon voters in a representation election.1 " This is merely the converse of the argument that was often cited
in opposition to Congress' lifting of the restrictions on employer free
speech when it passed section 8(c) of the Act. 2 5 The "inherent" potential
for coercion that exists in the employment situation because of the
122. 179 N.L.R.B. 219, 72 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1969).
123. Id. at 223, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1293 (citations omitted).
124. See J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J. AuRA, NLRB REPRESENTATION

ELECTIONs-LAW,

PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 537 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Feerick].

125. NLRB v. Golden Age Beverage Co., 415 F.2d 26, 30 (5th Cir. 1969); see 93 CONG.
R.c. 3251 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIsT. LMRA, at 681.
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master-servant relationship is simply not present where the relationship
is absent. Recognizing the diminution of potential for coercion, the
Board"' and courts" 7 often attribute less weight to the conduct of third
parties in representation cases than would be the case if the conduct were
engaged in by a party to the election.
In Orleans Manufacturing Co.,12 8 for example, the Board considered
third-party conduct of employees in the context of employer objections to
an election. The conduct consisted of a series of threats by employeesupporters of a union against anti-union employees to the effect that
union opponents would be "beaten up" by the union supporters; that

"teenagers would whip them"; that they would be "run out of town"; and
that they would be sued if they opposed the union.12 9 The threats were
made by rank and file employees who were neither officers nor agents of
the union, nor so "closely associated with [the union] at the time of the
alleged threat as to warrant other employees in believing [that they] had
authority to act for [the union]."1 0 The Board held that although the
conduct occurred during the "critical period,"181 it did not interfere with
the election because it was undertaken by persons who were not agents.

The Board stated:
The Board believes that the conduct of third persons tends to have less
effect upon the voters than similar conduct attributable to the employer
who has, or the union which seeks, control over the employees' working
conditions. Furthermore, were the Board to give the same weight to conduct by third persons as to conduct attributable to the parties, the possibility of obtaining quick and conclusive election results would be substantially diminished. The employer and the union are deterred from
126. See, e.g., Fabricut, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1196, 1197, 94 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1005 (1977);
Information Magnetics Corp., 227 N.L.R.B. 1493, 1495, 94 L.R.R.M. 1313, 1316 (1977); Orleans Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 633, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016, 1017 (1958); see generally Feerick,
supra note 124, at 537-546.
127. See NLRB v. Aaron Bros., 563 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Georgetown
Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1242 (4th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Monroe Auto Equip. Co., 470
F.2d 1329, 1332 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973); NLRB v. Griffith Oldsmobile, Inc., 455 F.2d 867, 870 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086,
1088 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970); see also NLRB v. White Knight Mfg.
Co., 474 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1974).
128. 120 N.L.R.B. 630, 42 L.R.R.M. 1016 (1958).
129. Id. at 630-31, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
130. Id. at 631, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1016.
131. The "critical period" is the period between the date the petition is filed, and the
date the election is held. This period is considered to be more sensitive in terms of potential
for election interference. Coercive conduct occurring during this period will ordinarily be
more closely scrutinized by the Board, and will usually result in an order setting the election
aside, in order to protect employee's free choice. F.W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1446,
1448-49, 34 L.R.R.M. 1584, 1585 (1954), order set aside in 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956).
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election misconduct by the unfair labor practice provisions of the Act
and by the trouble and expense which repeated elections impose upon
them. The absence of similar deterrents against third persons who wish
to forestall a conclusive election may make them more prone to engage in
conduct calculated to prevent such a result. In view of these considerations, we do not believe that the employee conduct described above
which occurred after the Board's Decision and Direction of
Election cre3 2
ated an atmosphere rendering a free election impossible.

A similar result was reached in Hometown Foods, Inc.,'3s in which the
employer alleged that the cumulative result of threats of job loss to antiunion employees, threats to shoot an employee if he drove a truck during
a strike, threats to "beat the hell out of" an anti-union employee, and
other assaults by union proponents and members on strike from another
company along with widespread rumors of sabotage to company vehicles

by unknown persons interfered with the election. The Board found that
no such interference arose from the threats either individually or cumulatively even though at least some of the threats would have been found
unlawful if engaged in by a party. The Board interpreted the Fifth Circuit's remand opinion'" as "dispensing with [the necessity of] a showing
of responsibility by one of the parties only where the conduct involved is
of so serious a nature that it could only result in widespread confusion
and fear of reprisal which would render impossible a rational, uncoerced
132. 120 N.L.R.B. at 633-34, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1017. See also Cross Baking Co., Inc., 191
N.L.R.B. 27, 28, 77 L.R.R.M. 1753, 1754 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st
Cir. 1971). In this case, a union proponent threatened and assaulted employee voters and
was subsequently discharged for the assault. One employee who was injured in the assault
was actually unable to return to work for two months. Even though the assailant was the
"principal union advocate," the Board upheld the election, finding that the two months that
elapsed between the assault and the election had dissipated the "atmosphere of fear" created thereby. The First Circuit emphasized on review that the question in these cases is not
the party's culpability on an agency theory but whether, in fact, the action created an atmosphere of fear and coercion. The Board had rejected offers of proof that such fear existed
immediately after the election, citing its rule for rejection of ex post facto testimony of
subjective facts announced in Gissel, 395 U.S. 575. The circuit court suggested that it was
error to apply this rule, since testimony concerning the existence of such fear is considerably
different from testimony concerning intent at the time of signing of authorization cards.
However, since there was no proffer of testimony concerning the existence of such fear at
the time of the election, the court considered the error harmless. 453 F.2d at 1349. Compare
Diamond State Poultry Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 3, 33 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1954), in which the event
occurred shortly before the election.
133. 172 N.L.R.B. 1242, 68 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1968), enforcement denied, 416 F.2d 392 (5th
Cir. 1969).
134. 379 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1967). The case was remanded for hearing on the employer's
objections to determine whether the cumulative effects of the pre-election and election practices of union supporters upon the minds of voters tainted the election result. The court also
emphasized that both objective and subjective testimony should be considered. Id. at 244.
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choice by employees."' 8 Finding only three incidents that actually would
amount to unlawful conduct if committed by a party, 183 the Board found
that these were not sufficient to justify a conclusion of "widespread con187
fusion and fear of reprisal" rendering a free choice impossible.
In Monroe Auto Equipment Co., Hartwell Division,'"'the Board further defined the standards for determining whether third-party nonagents' conduct has rendered a free election impossible. Again, the case
was on remand from the Fifth Circuit,' which directed a hearing on employer objections, inter alia, concerning misrepresentations of material
facts by union supporters and threats of job loss and bodily harm to antiunion employees by union proponents. The trial examiner and the Board
found that, although the threats of job loss and bodily harm to company
supporters were made by union proponents, the threats were not taken
seriously by the employees and did not cause the company supporters to
change their minds in the ballot booth. Thus, there was not created a
"'general' atmosphere of confusion and fear of reprisal which rendered
impossible a free election."1 0 In such cases in which the conduct objected
to is alleged to have been committed by nonagents of the parties, the
Board said it would: (1) consider the objections cumulatively rather than
as isolated individual incidents to determine their potential for coercion;
(2) in addition to its usual "objective evaluation" of the incidents, consider the testimony of subjective fear and coercion created by the incidents, in order to determine whether the interference which resulted from
the conduct was sufficient to warrant setting the election aside; and (3)
most importantly, determine not only whether the conduct complained of
was in fact coercive, but was "so related to the election as to have a probable effect upon the employees' actions at the polls or created an environment of tension or coercion such as to preclude employees from exercising
'
free choice.'
Applying these standards, the Board found that the nonagent employees' coercive statements and conduct did not sufficiently interfere with
free choice since all of the conduct was committed by rank and file employees "whose power to effectuate their action and words the other employees could certainly evaluate."'"42 Moreover, there was no evidence that

135. 172 N.L.R.B. at 1247, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1483 (citations omitted).
136. These included three threats of job loss and physical harm.
137. 172 N.L.R.B. at 1247, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1483.
138. 186 N.L.R.B. 90, 75 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1970), a/I'd, 470 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1972).
139. NLRB v. Monroe Auto Equip. Co., Hartwell Div., 406 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1969).
140. 186 N.L.R.B. at 95, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1346.
141. Id. at 92-93, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1343. But cf. James Lees & Sons Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 290,
291 n.1, 47 L.R.R.M. 1285, 1286 n.1 (1961).
142. 186 N.L.R.B. at 98, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1348.
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knowledge of the alleged misconduct was widely circulated throughout
the voting unit. 48
The independence of the party engaging in the conduct does not assure
that the conduct will be judged insufficient to warrant a rerun election,
especially when the Board finds the coercive activities so pervasive that a
general atmosphere of fear was created thereby. One of the cornerstone
cases supporting this principle is P.D. Gwaltney, Jr.& Co.' 44 In that case,

the Board found that the clearly coercive conduct engaged in by members
of the community could not be attributed to either party to the election.
The case involved an election in Smithfield, Virginia, among a voting unit
that was nearly eighty percent black. The town, which was located in a
rural area of Virginia, was heavily dependent upon the employer, a meat
packing company, for its prosperity. When a union attempted to organize
the plant, the citizens of Smithfield organized a committee to oppose it,
headed by a local insurance agent and a newspaper publisher. They circulated petitions against the C.I.O., published newspaper articles predicting
"trouble and strife" in Smithfield if the union came in, and conducted
mass meetings of Smithfield citizens. In speeches delivered at those meetings, the ugly specter of the Ku Klux Klan was raised as a threat to both
union organizers and pro-union (black) employees, and the possibility of
plant closure was suggested. Other veiled threats were made at the meetings and at other times to the effect that the organizers should be thrown
in the river, or lynched. Finally, the town's law enforcement establishment participated in the threats to the union organizers and stationed
themselves prominently in front of the polling places during the election.
After the election was over, they "escorted" union organizers to their cars.
Concerning this conduct, the Board stated that
in appraising the facts and determining the Board's duty in the premises,
more is involved than the mere determination of whether or not the Employer was itself responsible for the anti-union conduct which immediately preceded the election. As already indicated, there is no convincing
evidence that would support a finding that the acts [which were coercive]
were the acts of this Employer, within the meaning of the statute. But
143. Id. This "power to effectuate threats" criteria is not always applied in a consistent
manner. For example, a party's threats to have illegal aliens "deported" were held sufficiently coercive to warrant a rerun election in Westside Hospital, 218 N.L.R.B. 96, 89
L.R.R.M. 1273 (1975); but they were insufficiently coercive to exacerbate the fears of the
illegal alien voters when made by third parties. Mike Yurosek & Sons, 225 N.L.R.B. 148, 92
L.R.R.M. 1535 (1976). But the deportation of an alien could be as readily accomplished by a
party or an "outsider." All that would be required is for either person to report the presence
of the illegal alien to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The party versus nonparty distinction should not apply to all kinds of threats, particularly when the coercive
effect is likely to be the same in either case.
144. 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 20 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1947).
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that does not dispose of the case, which relates to the validity of a Board
election, any more than would the fact that a hurricane or other Act of
God could not be attributed to an Employer necessarily lead to the conclusion that an election conducted in the atmosphere created by such a
natural phenomenon must be upheld as a true expression of the employees' desires. The issue before us here is whether, under all the circumstances, this election was held in an atmosphere conducive to the sort of
free, unintimidated choice of representatives which the Act contemplates. We find that it was not."4 5
Thus the unattributable coercive conduct served as a basis for overturning the election.
Although in James Lees & Sons CO., 146 a union attempted unsuccessfully to link to an employer a coercive community campaign that centered
around threats of imminent plant closure if a union were chosen by the
employees, a rerun of the election was nevertheless ordered by the Board.
The community campaign was undertaken independently of the employer
by local community leaders including city councilmen, newspaper publishers, the local bank cashier, local restauranteurs, directors of a local
chamber of commerce, and others. The threats concerning plant closure
were published in newspaper advertisements as well as in headlines in
editorials. They were mailed to employee homes and were also delivered
verbally in home visits by various leaders as well as verbally in restaurants, stores, and in a local bank. The bank cashier suspended making
loans pending the outcome of the election. The impact of possible unionization upon the community wherein the employer operated was "of
profound interest and concern to the communit[y].114 7 Its response was to
confront the employees "at every turn in their daily lives . . . with the
prospect that the plant would shut down if [the union] prevailed."1 4
Even without employer participation, this prospect created the "general
atmosphere of fear and confusion" upon which the Board based its order
14
directing a new election.

145. Id. at 379-80, 20 L.R.R.M. at 1173-74. In this case, which preceded the decisions in
Home Town Foods, 172 N.L.R.B. 1242, 68 L.R.R.M. 1478, and Monroe Auto Equip., 186
N.L.R.B. 90, 75 L.R.R.M. 1341, the Board did not consider evidence of the subjective effects
of the coercive conduct.
146. 130 N.L.R.B. 290, 47 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1961).
147. Id. at 298.
148. Id. at 299. See also Falmouth Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 896, 900, 37 L.R.R.M. 1057, 1058
(1955).
149. Id. at 291, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1286. The Regional Director had found "no evidence that
the Employer did anything to disavow the threats contained in the newspaper articles and
ads to the effect that the plant would close if the Union were successful." Id. at 299. Chairman Leedon and Member Rogers argued that propaganda by the community members, who
were acting in their own self-interest and out of their concern for the continuity of the
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In determining whether an anti-union campaign of third parties has a
probable impact of interfering with free choice, the Board has repeatedly
stated that the applicable yardstick is whether "fear of economic loss so
permeate[s] the atmosphere surrounding the election as to render impossible the rational, uncoerced selection of a bargaining representative as
contemplated by the Act."1 Generally, the more pervasive the instances
of coercive anti-union conduct are, the more likely the Board is to set
aside the election. In Utica-Herbrand Tool Division of Kelsey-Hayes
Co., " ' the employer himself had engaged in objectionable conduct by indicating in speeches to the employees that nothing could be gained by the
union except through a strike. Moreover, he made several other statements warning employees that a union victory would ultimately turn the
community in to a distressed area by discouraging further development,
and by implying that a union victory would cause the company to move
away again. This theme was echoed and embellished in a massive antiunion campaign conducted independently by third parties within the
community of Orangeburg, South Carolina. Visits were made to the
homes of employees by various local police officers and the mayor of the
town and other community leaders, during which visits they expressed
the view that the plant would move if the union won the election. Coercive literature was distributed at all banks in the community. Advertisements were placed in the town's only newspaper by a committee of "Interested Citizens" that stressed, inter alia, that a union would stifle the
growth of the community and that unions caused strikes. A local attorney, who had served in the state legislature, sent a letter to several employees' homes emphasizing that the recent establishment of a new industry in Orangeburg could be lost if the employees "betrayed the trust" of
industrialists by permitting unions to come in and take over. Constant
spot announcements, also sponsored by the "Interested Citizens," hammered upon the themes of the inevitablity of strikes, violence, job loss,
and economic hardship to the communities resulting from strikes. And,
an advertisement signed by the Orangeburg legislative delegation and the
mayor was published in the local newspaper indicating that the decision
of two unnamed companies to locate near the community would be adversely affected if employees chose the union. Finally, two letters of the
plant, did not exceed lawful bounds, could be adequately evaluated by employees (because
it was based on information generally available to them), and could have been (and actually
was) answered by the union. They specifically disagreed with the majority's implication that
the employer "had a duty to disavow gratuitously the activities of the townspeople. See
Goodyear Clearwater Mill No. 2, 102 N.L.R.B. 1329, 1348, [31 L.R.R.M. 14471; Northrop
Aircraft, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 23, 25, [32 L.R.R.M. 1390J." Id. at 292, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1286.
150. Falmouth Co., 114 N.L.R.B. at 900-01, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1058.
151. 145 N.L.R.B. 1717, 55 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964).
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employer stressed the theme that the only way the union could obtain
concessions from the company would be by striking, which could lead to
job loss through replacement. A newspaper editorial four days later implied that the law permitted the employer to fire employees for striking,
and also that it would be difficult for replaced strikers to find employment either at the company or anywhere else in the community. This
virtual catalog of coercive conduct (which was found not to have emanated from the employer) created the atmosphere of fear and coercion
which--even standing alone without the
employer's objectionable con62
duct-required a rerun of the election.
Effective disavowal of the independent third party's pervasively coercive actions by the targeted employer may sufficiently dispell the coercive
atmosphere attendant to such actions to reestablish the sterility required
for an election. In Claymore ManufacturingCo.,18 8 such an effective disavowal was found. The employer and union had conducted vigorous preelection campaigns. A group of businessmen and civic and professional
leaders in the town interceded with an anti-union campaign that coercively sounded the familiar alarm of imminent plant closing, and the
theme of consequential economic disaster facing the town.18 ' The union
countered the town's propaganda by denying that the plant would close
as a result of unionization, and by admonishing employees to be wary of
the "scare bait." The employer's campaign statements had indicated that
it was continuing to operate at a loss and that even a few of the union's
promises, if fulfilled, could lead it into bankruptcy. But it had also stated
that it was determined to keep the plant operating for as long as possible.
Several of the employer's campaign letters repeated these themes and
contained general denials of the "rumors" of imminent plant closing. In
one the employer said:
A number of rumors have been called to our attention . .. such as that
the plant is about to be closed down or that the plant will be moved to
some other town. We cannot keep up with all the rumors and gossip and
cannot issue statements every day. WE CAN SAY THIS ... please disregard ALL rumors. The future of this plant will be decided by the officers and the directors of the company and only the statements issued
by officers of this company as to the future of this plant can be regarded as reliable and authentic.1'
152. Id. at 1720-26, 55 L.R.R.M. at 1225-29.
153. 146 N.L.R.B. 1400, 56 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1964).
154. Not only would the plant close and move, they told the employees, but the town
would be unable to get federal assistance for new water and sewer projects; other plants
would refuse to locate in the town. In addition, there were threats of unspecific harm to
employees emanating from unionization. Id. at 1405-08.
155. Id. at 1409, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1083 (emphasis in original).

716

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The employer also assured the employees that "if we are permitted to
stay in the manufacturing business, we hope and confidently expect to do
better with your help and cooperation. . . . Regardless of rumors, it is
our intention to try our level best to keep this plant going regardless of
the outcome of the election."'" The Board, over the dissent of Chairman
McCulloch and Member Brown,' 57 found this disavowal to be effective
and certified the results of the election.
When the employer's disavowal of the threats of independent third
parties is ineffective, however, the election will be set aside. In Monarch
Rubber Co., 158 the local newspaper publisher had gratuitously printed an
advertisement the day before the election that threatened employees with
job loss if the union won the election. Before the advertisment was
printed, the publisher showed a copy of it to the employer who pointed
out various items in the ad that were inapplicable to the company. He
otherwise indicated neither approval nor disapproval of the publisher's
design. After the advertisement was published, the employer called the
publisher and disclaimed any and all support of it. The Board held that
although the employer was not responsible for the advertisement, his disavowal was ineffective to dissipate the advertisement's coercive effects.
Thus, the election was set aside.' 59 Similarly, in Falmouth Co.,'"0 the
Board found the employer's disavowal of an intent to close the plant insufficient to dissipate the widespread fear of plant closure that had been
induced by local businessmen and political leaders. The disavowal consisted of a "single statement [in a speech supporting a 'local union' over
the petitioning AFL union] devoted to assuring the employees of the continued operations of the plant."''6 The Board set aside the election be156. Id. (emphasis supplied).
157. Id. at 1403, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1085. The dissenters stated that they were unable to
distinguish the facts of this case from those in Utica-Herbrand Tool Div. of Kelsey-Hayes
Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1717, 55 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964). They would have found that the employer's letter re-emphasized the unlawful threats. See also Falmouth Co., 114 N.L.R.B. at
896, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1058-59.
158. 121 N.L.R.B. 81, 42 L.R.R.M. 1294 (1958).
159. Id. at 83, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1294. See also NLRB v. Moench Tanning Co., 121 F.2d
951 (2d Cir. 1941). But see NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1038 (1970) (disavowal found effective).
160. 114 N.L.R.B. 896, 37 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1955).
161. Id. at 901, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1059. After urging the employees to support the "local"
organization over the AFL petitioner, the employer said:
We are not permitted to make any promises and certainly are not making any
threats . . . that the Falmouth Company will close if you vote in favor of the
[AFL-Union]. We assure you that the Falmouth Company was organized and
opened to serve you people and this community and that it will continue to operate and serve you regardless of which Union wins tomorrow, or if no Union wins.
Id. at 900, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1058. Thus even clearly exculpatory remarks will not remove the
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cause of the pervasive atmosphere of fear of economic loss resulting from
the third party action, without even considering the regional director's
finding that the employer had acted in concert with the businessmen. 1"
Moreover, when the employer is aware of the threats such as those of
plant closure and does not disavow them, even if they are made by persons with no actual or ostensible agency relations (so that the acts might
be imputed to the employer) his failure to disavow them may add to the
grounds for setting the election aside. In Florida-TexasFreight,16e an employee, having pilfered a confidential employer document that detailed
company plans to curtail production if the union won an impending election, told his fellow employees about the contents of the document. While
neither the employer nor the union was responsible for disseminating the
contents of the document, nonetheless the contents became known to the
voters. The Board set the election aside noting that the threat contained
in the document was sufficient to pollute the voting atmosphere. It noted:
"Of course, here there was no attempt to disavow the intent to shut down
the terminal should the Union win, nor is it likely that, in the face of such
a clear statement to the contrary by Employer, any disavowal would have
been effective."' " It has been argued that when no agency exists there
ought to be no obligation imposed upon the targeted employer to disavow
the threat of independent third-parties. 116 But this argument ignores the
prophylactic nature of the Board's election-oversight function. In the context of examining non-agent third-party conduct, the Board's analysis operates on a no-fault presupposition. It looks only to the degree of coerciveness of the conduct and to the extent to which that conduct
permeates the election environment.
To be effective, the employer's disavowal should be communicated not
merely to the persons making the threats, but especially to the employees
comprising the electorate.'" It is not enough that the disavowal be
couched in such terms that it dispels the apparent link of agency between
the third-party utterer and the employer. 67 Rather it must be reasonably
likely to dissipate the coercive effects of the third party's conduct upon
the employees. Chairman McCullouch and Member Brown in their discoerciveness of the community's actions in the judgment of the Board.
162. 114 N.L.R.B. at 901, 37 L.R.R.M. at 1059.
163. 230 N.L.R.B. 952, 95 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1977); see also Utica-Herbrand Tool Div. of
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1717, 55 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964).
164. Id. at 952, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1427.
165. See the dissenting opinion of Chairman Leedom and Member Rogers in James Lees
& Sons Co., 130 N.L.R.B. at 292, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1286.
166. Compare Monarch Rubber Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 81, 42 L.R.R.M. 1294, (1958), with
Claymore Mfg. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1400, 56 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1964).
167. But cf. Claymore Mfg. Co., 146 N.L.R.B. at 1402, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1084.
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senting opinion in Claymore'" seem to require considerably more. They
appear to say that the employer must go even farther and promise that
the threats, such as those of plant closures, will not be accomplished,
even though it is quite possible that a plant in a precarious financial position will be forced to close soon after the election (perhaps even as a result of the productivity disruption attendant upon the election process
and, should the union win, subsequent contract negotiations). To require
"unequivocal" disavowal as envisoned by the dissenters in Claymore
would in effect be misleading to the employees and would deprive them
of vital, relevant information. Thus, such "unequivocal" disavowal should
not be required in all cases, especially when plant closure for lawful reasons is a possibility. The effectiveness of disavowals should be judged by
applying the same sort of analysis that was utilized in Home Town
Foods" and in Monroe Auto Equipment, 70 which would permit testimony of the subjective impressions that such disavowal statements left in
the minds of the employees.1 7 The potential for post-election prevarications by witnesses partial to either side is certainly no greater in these
cases than it was in those.
The decision in P.D. Gwaltney,17 James Lees,' 7' and Utica-Herbrand'7" are typical of a class of cases in which the Board must measure
the effects upon employee freedom of choice of en mass anti-union coercive conduct, committed by third parties who have no agency relationship
to the targeted employer. Even though such non-attributable third party
conduct generally is considered to have a less significant impact upon employee choice (and thus is treated by the Board with a larger measure of
forbearance),' 7 5 it may nevertheless be found to be coercive when the conduct occurs with such frequency throughout the campaign that it confronts employees at virtually every turn of their daily lives, is engaged in
by persons of such stature as to afford the conduct more coercive significance, or when it is of such a threatening character that it creates a pervading atmosphere of fear, confusion or tension throughout the voting
unit sufficient to deprive employees of their freedom of choice. The test,
as indicated by the Board and the Fifth Circuit in Hometown Foods and
Monroe Auto Equipment, is of the cumulative effect or the sum of the
168. 146 N.L.R.B. at 1402, 56 L.R.R.M. at 1084.
169. 172 N.L.R.B. 1242, 168 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1968).
170. 186 N.L.R.B. 90, 75 L.R.R.M. 1341 (1970).
171. The suggestion herein has application only in the context of representation cases
where the Board is considering only the question of the validity of the election as a measure
of employee free choice.
172. 74 N.L.R.B. 371, 20 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1947).
173. 130 N.L.R.B. 290, 47 L.R.R.M. 1285 (1961).
174. 145 N.L.R.B. 1717, 55 L.R.R.M. 1223 (1964).
175. See notes 126-127 supra, and accompanying text.
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conduct.
Not only is non-attributable third-party conduct judged according to a
more permissive standard,17 6 the effects of a finding of interference with
an election by third parties are less severe. When the targeted employer
has not been found to have engaged in substantial unfair labor practices,
no bargaining order will issue against him,17 and the Board will simply
order a rerun of the election. 7M Although the new election is ordinarily
held "as soon as possible after the original election is set aside," it may be
delayed in1 order to dispel the coercive residue of the community's
9
conduct.

7

The more liberal standards for evaluating the coerciveness of conduct
preceding an election are not available to parties where an agency relationship exists between them. In such cases the third party-agent's actions will be judged by the same standards as are the employer's, and the
actions will be imputed to the employer. 80 Moreover, in such cases not
only will the Board's or court's orders be binding upon the targeted employer, but they will also run against the agent.'8 ' This occurs even when
the agent, if acting in his individual capacity, could not be found guilty of
an unfair labor practice due to the statutory exclusions of such persons
from the Board's jurisdiction. 18 2 Thus, it is critical to determine which
176. But see Lifetime Door Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 13, 62 L.R.R.M. 1029 (1966), afj'd, 390
F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1968). Relatively mild coercive statements were made to relatives of two
employees by the town minister, an insurance agent, and the Farm Bureau president. The
Police Chief and an appliance store owner predicted plant closure and economic hardship
for the town to one other employee. The town's mayor threatened plant closure to one employee and a fourth employee was told that the union would prevent other jobs from coming
into town, and that the employee would find it hard to get another job in the state if the
union came in. The Board found this to constitute an atmosphere of "fear and economic
reprisal." Id. at 25, 62 L.R.R.M. at 1032-33.
177. Compare Gissel, 395 U.S. 575.
178. See, e.g., Florida-Texas Freight, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 952, 95 L.R.R.M. 1426 (1977).
179. NLRB, Case-handling Manual (Part Two), Representation Cases, $11452 (1975).
180. See, e.g., Henry I. Siegel Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 825, 69 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1968), enforced,
417 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985 (1974); Phillips Indus., Inc., 172
N.L.R.B. 2119, 69 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1968), enforced sub nom. Harry Clark v. NLRB, 410 F.2d
756 (4th Cir. 1969); General Metal Prods. Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 64, 65 L.R.R.M. 1002, enforced,
410 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1970).
181. See, e.g., Phillips Indus., Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 2119, 69 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1968); Dean
Indus., Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1078, 64 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1967).
182. See, e.g., NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946) (town
mayor); Henry I. Siegel Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 825, 69 L.R.R.M. 1094 (1968) (town mayor); Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 703, 65 L.R.R.M. 1626 (1967), enforced in pertinent part,
406 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1969); supp. op. 183 N.L.R.B. 50, 76 L.R.R.M. 1789 (1970), enforced,
440 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1971) (town mayor and sheriff). (The subsequent history is not relevant to the agency principle for which the case is cited); Dean Indus., Inc., 162 N.L.R.B.
1078, 64 L.R.R.M. 1193 (1967). Compare NLRB v. Payless Lumber Stores, 508 F.2d 24 (8th
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factors will lead to a determination that a community member is an
"agent" of the targeted employer.
B. Standards of Agency
The RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY defines the term "agency" as follows:

"Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." 188 Agency
has three elements: the manifestation by the principal that the agent is to
act for him, the acceptance by the agent of the undertaking, and the mutual understanding of both that the principal is to be in control of the
undertaking.'" There need be no formal contract between the principal
and the agent as such, although there does need to be at least an implied
agreement. The agreement comprising this relationship is created as a result of conduct of the two parties that manifests that one is willing to
have the other act for him, subject to his control, and that the other is
willing to undertake the act. ' "
While these standards, derived from common law, would appear to require at least a small degree of conscious intent of both the employerprincipal and the putative "outsider"-agent, the Board, with court approval, has not always looked so closely at the relationship before imputing liability to the employer. In a word, the Board's standards for finding
an agency relationship, and consequently for imputing the conduct of the
third-party to the employer's, are loose.'"
These court-and Board-developed liberal standards at times appear to
frustrate the Congressional purpose that prompted the inclusion of the
"agency" provisions of the act. Few court decisions, and almost no Board
decisions, have adequately examined or discussed the evolution of the
agency concept.
C. Evolution of Agency
The Wagner Act contained no specific provisions relating to "agency."
The broad prohibitions against employer conduct, which were contained
in Senator Wagner's initial draft of the act, included acts committed by
an "employer or any one acting in his interest, directly or indirectly."'87
An "employer" was defined as any "person who has one or more employCir. 1974) (mayor's threat to slash tires of anti-union employer found coercive).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
184. Id. Comment b.
185. Id. Comment a.
186. See generally [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 9244.
187. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST. NLRA, at 3.
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ees."168 Some critics of Wagner's bill considered this definition, limiting
the prohibitions to persons actually employing other individuals, to be a
loophole through which an employer could evade liability for unlawful
conduct by interfering with employees' rights through persons other than
the employer himself. They suggested that the act's prohibitions should
be made to cover acts of or statements by the employer's officers, supervisors, or other agents as well as the employer himself.1s" The Wagner Act
closed the loophole by providing: "The term employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall
not include the United States, or any State or political subdivision
thereof....moo
Unhampered by the constraints of agency requirements, the Board and
the courts during the period after passage of the Wagner Act frequently
imputed liability to employers for a broad range of anti-union actions undertaken by individuals who sometimes had little or no connection with
the employer, or over whom the employer was able to exercise scant control. In Brown Shoe Co.,19' for example, the company was found liable for
the acts of townspeople taken against union supporters and agents. These
acts included the beating of a union agent by unknown assailants, the
slandering and near tarring-and-feathering of a union agent by a mob of
town citizens, formation of an anti-union citizens committee, threats to
run a union organizer out of town, refusals by anti-union workers to work
with pro-union employees, threats against city employees who were related to pro-union employees, threats to evict pro-union employees by
their landlords, and the discharge of non-employees who were sympathetic to the union by their employers. The theory of liability rested upon
the company's hostility to the union; which was coupled with the town's
fear that the plant would close in the event of a strike, and with the company's economic dominance of the town. In other cases, companies were
found responsible for the anti-union actions of town mayors and city officials,192 members of the Chambers of Commerce,1 9 3 landlords,' 4 rank and

188.

Id. at § 3(a), 1 LEGIS. HIST. NLRA, at 2.

189. See To Create a National Labor Relations Board, Hearing on S. 2926, Before the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 226-27 (1934), reprinted
in 1 LEGIS. HIsT. NLRA, at 256-57 (statement of Otto Boerger). The House version of the
Bill, H.R. 8423, concerned the same provisions as the original Wagner bill. H.R. 8423, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 1 LEGiS. HIsT. NLRA, at 1129-30.
190. Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976)).
191.

1 N.L.R.B. 803, 1 L.R.R.M. 78 (1936).

192. See, e.g., Western Cartridge Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 179, 11 L.R.R.M. 33 (1942), enforced,
138 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1943); Merit Clothing Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 1201, 8 L.R.R.M. 118 (1941);
Elkland Leather Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 519, 2 L.R.R.M. 490 (1938), enforced, 114 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.
1940); Washington Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 970, 1A L.R.R.M. 429, dismissed, 97 F.2d 1010 (6th
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file employees, 15 and supervisors.'" In some cases, even when the supervisors were actually disobeying employer instructions (and hence acting
outside the scope of their authority), the employer was nevertheless held
liable for their unlawful actions.'"
The Board's decisions imputing liability to employers for the actions of
third persons met with mixed success in the appellate courts."98 In NLRB
v. International Shoe Co.,1' the Board was harshly criticized by the
Eighth Circuit, which said "[s]ome restraint is exercised when we say only
that a hodge-podge of suspicions, farfetched inferences and pure guesses,
the like of this one, not often has been built up."' It rejected a Board
finding of company domination in the formation of a non-affiliated union
based upon the company's suggestion that the employees, who sought the
employer's advice on the formation of a union, speak to a number of individuals including an individual prominent in the local chamber of commerce, two former mayors of the town, a Catholic priest, a Lutheran minister, a probate judge, and the Grand Master of the Missonic Lodge.' 0'
Cir. 1938).
193. See, e.g., American Pearl Button Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 1113, 13 L.R.R.M. 85 (1943),
enforced in pertinent part, 149 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1945).
194. See, e.g., Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 46 N.L.R.B. 825, 11 L.R.R.M. 242, enforced 142 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1944).
195. See, e.g., Draper Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 1477, 13 L.R.R.M. 88 (1943), enforcement denied, 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); Ford Motor Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 322, 6 L.R.R.M. 571 (1940),
enforced in pertinent part, 119 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1941); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 21
N.L.R.B. 306, 6 L.R.R.M. 91 (1940), enforced in pertinent part, 129 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.
1942); Standard Hat Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 883, 5 L.R.R.M. 355 (1939); Halff Mfg. Co., 16
N.L.R.B. 667, 5 L.R.R.M. 256 (1939).
196. See, e.g., American Steel Scraper Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 939, 8 L.R.R.M. 18 (1941); Jahn
& Oliver Engraving Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 893, 6 L.R.R.M. 440 (1940), enforced, 123 F.2d 589
(7th Cir. 1941); Frost Rubber Works, 23 N.L.R.B. 1071, 6 L.R.R.M. 440 (1940); California
Walnut Growers Ass'n, 18 N.L.R.B. 493, 5 L.R.R.M. 419 (1939); Schwarze Elec. Co., 16
N.L.R.B. 246, 5 L.R.R.M. 227 (1939); Swift & Co., 15 N.L.R.B. 992, 5 L.R.R.M. 190, enforced, 116 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1940).
197. American Steel Scraper Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 939, 8 L.R.R.M. 18 (1941); Schult Trailers,
Inc., 28 N.L.R.B. 975, 7 L.R.R.M. 162 (1941); California Walnut Growers Ass'n, 18 N.L.R.B.
493, 5 L.R.R.M. 419 (1939); Schwarze Elec. Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 246, 5 L.R.R.M. 227 (1939);
American Oil Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 990, 5 L.R.R.M. 82 (1939).
198. See NLRB v. Thompson Prods., 162 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1947) (link between company and private attorney insufficient); NLRB v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 142 F.2d
866 (9th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Ass'n of Calif., 122 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1941),
enforcing 15 N.L.R.B. 322, 5 L.R.R.M. 123; Moench Tanning Co., 121 F.2d 951 (2d Cir.
1941) (Board decision affirmed as to liability for "supervisor's" acts; denied as to liability of
private attorney and newspaper).
199. 116 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1940), denying enforcement to 12 N.L.R.B. 728, 4 L.R.R.M.
188 (1939).
200. Id. at 37.
201. Id.
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These individuals counseled the employees to form an independent organization. In NLRB v. Moench Tanning Co.,"'0 the Second Circuit affirmed the Board's finding that an employer was liable for the acts of his
supervisors who engaged in various acts of interference and coercion of
employees as well as domination of a non-affiliated union, while the company refused to bargain with the CIO affiliated group. The supervisors'
acts consisted of telling employees that a recent plant shutdown had occurred because the local union had affiliated with the CIO (which was
untruthful), interrogating employees, and promising them benefits if they
resigned from the CIO union. They also aided in the formation of the
independent union; two supervisors became officers of the independent.
In addition to the supervisors' actions, a local banker had publicly attacked the CIO, making unspecified threats to employees loyal to the
CIO, and had caused resolutions by various organizations in the town
critical of the CIO supporters to be reprinted and mailed to employees. A
village attorney presided over a meeting of employees at which he suggested that employees form the independent union. The village newspaper also attacked the CIO union. The Second Circuit was willing to affirm
the Board in imputing liability to the employer for the acts of the supervisors based upon the "liberalized" standards available under the act for
imputing agency to employers, but was unwilling to base a finding of liability on the actions of the city attorney, the local banker, or the village
newspaper articles. 0 3
The liberal agency standards for imputing liability to an employer for
the acts of others were illuminated by the Supreme Court in the following
three cases: International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 04" H.J.
Heinz Co. v. NLRB,'20 and NLRB v. Link-Belt Co.'06 In those cases, the
202. 121 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1941).
203. Id. at 953-54. The court also noted:
Such evidence would not of course have been competent at common law to affix
liability to an employer, unless they had been uttered within the scope of the
declarant's authority. The rule is otherwise, however, as to this statute, for the
Supreme Court has decided in three recent cases that declarations made by "supervisory employees" will charge the employer though they would not charge him
under the doctrine, respondeat superior. International Association, etc., v.
N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 79, 80, 61 S.Ct. 83, 85 L.Ed. 50; H.J.Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
311 U.S. 514, 520, 521, 61 S.Ct. 320, 85 L.Ed. 309; N.L.R.B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311
U.S. 584, 599, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368. The result of this is that interference by
such employees with the rights guaranteed by § 7 is legally the equivalent of interference by the employer himself. The question is not one of evidence, but of imputed liability.
Id.
204. 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
205. 311 U.S. 514 (1940).

206. 311 U.S. 584 (1940).
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Court said that the question of liability for the acts of supervisors did not
depend upon the scope of their authority as granted them by their employer,2 0 7 but rather upon employees' reasonable perceptions of that
authority.' 0 '
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in these three cases was
essentially to substitute the element of the employees' perceptions of an
individual's authority for the element of the employer's control over the
actions of the agent. The tendencies of the Board and some courts to play
"fast and loose" with the principles of agency alarmed many members of
Congress. These concerns resulted in a new definition of "employer" in
the Taft-Hartley Amendments'O" to the Wagner Act. "The term employer
includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or

indirectly.

.

.

,210

1

The legislative history underlying this provision demonstrates clearly
that this was not merely a cosmetic change. Congressman Hartley's bill, 11
unlike Senator Taft's bill, 1'2 reflected the determination of the House of
Representatives that the Board and the courts should restrict their attribution of liability for coercive acts to persons who were agents of the
employer. Taft's bill had no such provision. When the different versions
of the House and Senate Bills were submitted by their respective authorizing bodies to a conference committee, the House version survived intact . 1 3 As the conference committee members reported back to the
House,
the House Bill changed [the Wagner Act definition] so as to include as
an employer only persons acting as agents of an employer. This was done
for the reason that the Board has on numerous occasions held an employer responsible for the acts of ... others although not acting within
the scope of any authority from the employer, real or apparent.'
207.

I.e., the element of control of principal over agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
1 (1957).
208. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 599 (1941).
209. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
211. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIST. LMRA at
33.
212. See S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2) (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIST. LMRA,
at 102. The Senate Committee members were apparently satisfied with the development of
the law in this area. They sought only to indicate their approval of the cases which included
employer associations within the definition of "employer."
213. Remarks of Sen. Taft, 93 CONG. REC. 6441 (1947). For a comprehensive discussion
of the vigorous debates taking place prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, see 1, 2 LEGis. HIST. LMRA.
214. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGIs. HIsT.
AGENCY §
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The requirements of agency that were deleted in the Wagner Act provisions ascribing liability to an employer for the actions of any person acting "in [his] interest, . . . directly or indirectly," were reinstated by the
Taft-Hartley Bill. It was Congress' explicit intention that the Board and
the courts examine the facts in every case to determine whether they satisfied the common law prerequisites for attributing liability to a party for
the actions of a third party. Congress clearly intended that an employer
should be held liable for the actions of only those individuals over whom
he had control within the common law standards of agency.
D.

Vicarious Liability in the Modern Era

Since the enactment of the agency requirements of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, the Board and the courts have hardly retreated an inch
from their Wagner Act approach to the determination of an employer's
vicarious liability. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the preTaft-Hartley cases from the post Taft-Hartley cases. Typical of the recalcitrance of the Board and the courts in refusing to recognize the "new"
standards is the decision of the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. General Metal
Products Co.' 15 In that case, the Board found that an employer was responsible for the coercive actions of the townspeople, including a local
attorney, named Warmath, who had "extensive interests and great influence in the community."' 16 Warmath was chairman of the board of a local
bank, partner in a real estate agency, part owner of the land upon which
the plant was located, and had a financial interest in the construction
company that built the plant. Warmath was seen as the critical link between the company and the various townspeople who engaged in coercive
activity designed to discourage employees from voting for a union.
Warmath was a personal friend of the company president. He had discussed his mutual opposition to the union with the company officials. He
was present, though not as an attorney or representative of the company,
during a meeting between company officials and union representatives at
which an election date was set. Warmath discussed the union with several
business and political associates. There was no evidence of any agreement
or conspiracy between the company and Warmath, or between Warmath
and the townspeople. However, the town mayor sent a company employee
who had complained to him about a traffic ticket to Warmath in order to
have the ticket "fixed." Warmath interrogated the employee about the
union, stated his opposition to the union, and told the employee that the
employee could "do him a favor" in return for fixing the ticket. Warmath
LMRA, at 535.
215. 410 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1973).
216. Id. at 474.
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did not specify what the favor was. A business associate of Warmath's
told another employee that she wanted to influence the employee "in any
way she could" to vote against the union. She told another employee's
wife that the company might move if the union came in. Warmath's law
partner reminded another employee of a plant that had moved from the
town after unionization. The Board and court found the company violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act through these activities of the various
townspeople. In its analysis, the court stated:
There is no question but that the activities of Warmath and his associates were coercive in nature. The pivotal question is whether their conduct can be attributed to the company. In dealing with this question, we
look to the Congressional Act and the cases interpreting it. In International Association of Machinists, Tool and Dye Makers Lodge No. 35,
etc. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 80 ... the Supreme Court emphasized the

general policy underlying passage of the Act. ".
not with private rights ...

.

. [W]e are dealing here

nor with technical concepts pertinent to an

employer's legal responsibility to third persons for acts of his service, but
with a clear legislative policy to free the collective bargaining process
from all taint of an employer's compulsion, domination or influence."
This reasoning was reaffirmed in PackardMotor Car Co. v.N.L.R.B., 330
U.S. 485 ... (1947).

International Association of Machinists and Packard were decided
under the Wagner Act. "Employer" was defined in that Act to include
"any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly."
With the passage of Taft-Hartley in 1947, the term "agent" was brought
into the Act. "Employer" was then defined to include "any person acting
as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." . . . [The] 1947 Act

included this addition: "In determining whether any person is acting as
an 'agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible
for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling. [29
U.S.C. § 152 (13) (1971)]."
The legislative history and the language of §2(2) make it clear that
Congress intended by the amendment to exonerate management of responsibility for the acts of those beyond its control and direction. But, it
is just as clear by the terms of §2(2), as amended, and by the addition of
§2(13) that Congress intended that strict rules of agency should not be
applied in determining employer responsibility ...."I
It is curious that the court cited InternationalAssociation of Machin-

ists in support of its decision, ignoring the fact that that decision was a
chief impetus behind the congressional limitations of employers' vicarious
liability for third party coercion which were inserted into the definition of
217.- Id. at 475.
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"employer." The court failed to recognize what was readily apparent to
the opponents of the Taft-Hartley Act: Congress wanted to overrule the
Supreme Court's liberal interpretations of the standards for attributing
such conduct to targeted employers announced in InternationalAssociation of Machinists. Moreover, the court's interpretation after reading section 2(2)'s definition of "employer" together with section 2(13)'s qualification of the standards of agency also reflects a lack of discernment, or even
ignorance, of the legislative history behind that section.
Section 2(13) was not intended to dilute the newly strengthened standards for protecting employers from unwarranted attribution of liability
for third parties' actions. That section was inserted into the Act in order
to deal with a congressional fear that unions might be insulated from liability for their unfair labor practices. As Senator Taft explained: "[Section 2(13)] restores the law of agency as it has been developed at common
law." "The conferees agreed that the ordinary law of agency should apply
to employer and union representatives."' 21 8 In restoring the "ordinary law
of agency" Congress was clearly not intending to provide a lower threshold for imputing liability to employers for the acts of third persons.
The restoration of the common law of agency to the Board's and the
court's legal analyses has not always been complete. Some cases apply
strict agency tests in determining an employer's liability for third party
actions.21 9 The decisions recite the standards but base their findings upon
facts which are extraneous to the common law agency tests.2 20 A still
larger body of decisions appears to ignore altogether the agency principles
developed at common law citing the "license" afforded them by the Supreme Court's decision in International Association of Machinists and
by section 2(13) of the Act 2 "
The majority of cases in which imputed liability is sought for the actions of third parties falls more or less within the class of "apparent
agency" cases. These are cases in which the actions of the employer, or
the relationship of the employer to the third party, are such that they
would give rise to the inference by employees that the third party apparently has authority to speak on behalf of the employer.
"Apparent authority," according to the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, is
"[t]he power to affect the legal relations of another person by transac-

218. See Statement of Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REC. 6858 (1947), reprinted in 2 LEGIS.
HIST. LMRA at 1622.

219. See, e.g., NLRB v. Russell Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1951), denying enforcement in part to 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 23 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1949).
220. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mayer, 196 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1952), denying enforcement in
part to 93 N.L.R.B. 590, 27 L.R.R.M. 1421 (1951).
221. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Metal Prods. Co., 410 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1973).
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tions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from
and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons."2 " This is somewhat different from strict agency per se, since the
scope of the authority depends not upon the actual grant of authority to
the agent, but upon the actual and reasonable belief of the third person2 2s
about the existence arid extent of the authority of the agent.22 4 In this
respect, the "manifestation" of the conferring of authority by the principal is of great importance. It may be made directly by the employer to
the employees, to the community in general, or by the proported agent
himself with the acquiescence of the employer.2 25 But, if the common law
of agency is to be applied in determining an employer's vicarious liability,
the Restatement makes it clear that the Board and courts must inquire
into not only what the employees could reasonably believe about the authority of the third party to speak for the targeted employer, but also
226
what they actually believed.
. An examination of the cases which have turned upon findings of "apparent" authority reveals that while the Board and courts often strain to
find the element of the employer's "manifestation" of the agency relationship, or the reasonableness of employees' beliefs about that relationship,
they do not inquire into the actual belief that employees who were allegedly coerced by the third-party derived from the manifestation of the
agency relationship. In NLRB v. General Metal Products Co., 227 for example, this element of "manifestation" of the grant of authority was apparently found in the act of the company in giving a list of employees'
names to the purported "agent" Warmath2 28 In Henry I. Siegel Co. v.
NLRB, 22 s the Board imputed liability to the employer for the coercive
statements of the town's mayor and a newspaper advertisement. In that
case, the company president reinforced any impression of employees that
the mayor could speak for the company by making a speech in which he
emphasized that the operations of the plant were a "cooperative venture
by the company and the town and the country."28 0 The Board and the
Sixth Circuit found that this speech effectively removed any doubt from
the employees' minds that the company approved of the mayor's actions.
OF AGENCY § 8 (1957).
In this analysis, the employee.
In this analysis, the "outsider" or community member.

222.
223.
224.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

225.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP AGENCY

§ 8, Comment c, Illustration 6 (1957).

226. Compare Monroe Auto Equip. Co., supra note 139 and accompanying text.
227. 410 F.2d 473 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1973).
228. See also NLRB v. Lake Butler Apparel Co., 392 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1968), enforcing
in pertinent part, 158 N.L.R.B. 863, 62 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1966).
229. 417 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1969).
230. Id. at 1214.
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Linked with other factors," 1 the mayor's coercion was attributed to the
employer, and both the employer and the mayor, as agent of the company, were enjoined from further violations.23" These cases, in which the
Board has found apparent authority, demonstrate the slender evidentiary
reeds upon which the Board will rest its legal conclusion that the em23
ployer has manifested a grant of authority to the third party. 1
Failure to disavow the activities of third persons has often served as the
basis for imputing liability to an employer for the third persons' coercive
conduct. In Cagle's, Inc. v. NLRB,'" the Fifth Circuit upheld a finding
that the employer was responsible for the coercive acts of the Executive
Director of the local Chamber of Commerce. The conferral of authority
arose when the plant manager was informed by the Director of the Director's intent to write the letter, and did nothing to dissuade him. When
the Chamber Director placed anti-union literature on the windshield of
employees' automobiles on the company parking lot, the plant manager
removed only half of them, even though their distribution violated a company no-distribution rule. But he took no action to disavow the Director's
activity, and personally conveyed a message from the Director to a union
proponent inviting that employee to visit the Director. Thus, when the
Director solicited employees' grievances and offered to convey a wage offer from employees to the employer, he was cloaked with apparent authority for the employer and thereby violated the Act. This backdoor theory of agency by omission is a common means by which the Board
imputes liability to an employer. It bears some fleeting resemblance to
the principles of acquiescence and affirmance under common law.230 It is

doubtful whether the Board's imputations of agency in this case will
withstand scrutiny under the common law tests. In Cagle, there was no
231. Among the factors were the close personal friendship between the mayor and the
company vice president, membership of both individuals in the civic club, and the fact that
the mayor had delivered a speech at the civic club warning that unions were detrimental in
the town's economic growth and urging businessmen to "stand up" to them.
232. See also NLRB v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1951), in which the court
upheld a finding of agency when coercive statements were made in a newspaper article and
mailed to employees' homes, because the employer furnished the publisher with a list of
employee's names.
233. See also Star Kist Samoa, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 238, 98 L.R.R.M. 1558 (1978).
234. 588 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1979).
235. At common law, affirmance occurs when the principal, here the employer, manifests
an intent to treat a previously unauthorized action taken on his behalf as authorized by his
word or action. Acquiescence, on the other hand, occurs when a principal fails to make
known his objection to unauthorized conduct of a third person whose previously conferred
agency status might reasonably be perceived to include such authority from the employer
(when the employer could have easily made his objection known). Acquiescence can result in
ratification or estoppel. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY §§ 83, 43, Comments a and c
(1957).
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evidence of any previous authorization which had been granted the outsiders, or which might support the conclusion that the employer had acquiesced in the activity of the third party so as to become liable under a
theory of ratification. Nor was there evidence of any word or action which
might be held to amount to affirmance of the coercive activity. Thus, it
can be argued there was no duty to disavow the conduct of the third
23 6
party.
The Board and the courts have on occasion refused to sustain a finding
that an employer was liable for coercive acts of outsiders because of his
failure to disavow those acts. In NLRB v. Mayer,2 3 7 the Fifth Circuit considered whether an employer was guilty of violating section 8(a)(1) of the
Act because of the actions of a "friend" who had secured signatures from
a majority of employees in a bargaining unit repudiating the union. The
employer's friend had accompanied the employer to a single bargaining
session. He had no financial interest, nor any control over the employer's
business or the employees. There was no evidence that the employer was
aware of or had consented to his "friend's" initiative. Unlike the Board,
the circuit court found nothing in the friend's activities to create the impression among the employees that the friend was acting for or at the
direction of the employer. Nor did they find that the employees were in
any way coerced.'" The circuit court rejected the Board's finding of
agency in this case stating:
This court has held that in order to charge an employer with the acts
of another ... such person must be one who in fact and law is the employer's agent. Such person must act under the employer's control and
direction or under his orders, or, if the acts were originally unauthorized,
they must be ratified expressly or impliedly before they can be attributed
to the employer. The mere fact that an employer receives and enjoys the
benefits of the unsolicited or3 unauthorized acts of another does not of
itself amount to ratification.'
236. Compare Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. 703, 65 L.R.R.M. 1626 (1967), aff'd in
pertinent part, 406 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128
(8th Cir. 1965).
237. 196 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1952), denying enforcement in part to 93 N.L.R.B. 590, 27
L.R.R.M. 1421 (1951). See also Hyster Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1973).
238. Id. at 290.
239. Id. Accord NLRB v. Russell Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1951), denying enforcement in part to 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 23 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1949). (Chief of police, bill collector, and town policemen are not agents of employer; they acted independently of employer.
Employer had no control over their actions.) In Mayer, the court cited, inter alia, the decision of the Sixth Circuit in NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta, 166 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1948), a case
which arose on the cusp of the period between the Wagner Act and the passage of the TaftHartley amendment. In that case, the Sixth Circuit enforced the finding of the Board that
the local chamber of commerce and other businessmen were not guilty of unfair labor prac-
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The elements which the Board will most commonly examine in determining whether an employer is vicariously liable for the actions of a third
party focus upon the relationship between the employer and the putative
"agent". The requisite relationship is ordinarily a financial one. ' " In
NLRB v. Hamburg Shirt Corp.,' 1 the business man had formed an industrial development corporation in an attempt to attract industry to the
community. They underwrote the cost of conducting labor surveys and
employment tests and endorsed notes to cover the cost of refurbishing the
training building and of conducting a training program. The nexus2 need
not necessarily be financial, however; it may be personal as well."
The degree of proximity of the relationship between the community
members and the employer, and the extent of coerciveness of his conduct
will ordinarily determine whether a Board order will specifically include
the individual in the affirmative action provisions of its cease and desist
order. There is no class of individuals who will be exempted from the
strictures of the Act."

After examining the relationship between the employer and the putative agent, the Board and the courts next looked to the act wherein
agency is conferred upon the third party. In many cases the act may seem
minor, such as delivering a list of employees' names to the agent."

In

tices when they circulated rumors that the plant would close, even though the employer had
not denied the rumors, since the action of those individuals (including their driving the
union organizers to leave town) was "spontaneous." However, the Board found the employer
vicariously guilty of the violation of a former town sheriff who engaged in unlawful coercion.
The link was made when the plant manager attached a note to the employee's time card
directing him to see the former sheriff at city hall.
240. See, e.g:, Rapid Mfg. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 465, 99 L.R.R.M. 1662 (1978); but see Goodyear Clearwater Mill, 102 N.L.R.B. 329, 31 L.R.R.M. 1287 (1953).
241. 371 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Similar financial involvement was a key element
which led to a determination of agency in Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d at 1206;
NLRB v. Lake Butler Apparel Co., 392 F.2d at 76; Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d at 128;
Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. at 703, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1626.
242. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Metals Prods. Co., 410 F.2d at 473; Henry I. Siegel Co.
v. NLRB, 417 F.2d at 1206.
243. Several groups have been imputed as agents for the employer. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Lake Butler Apparel Co., 392 F.2d at 76 (actions of Industrial Development Board held
attributable to employer due to financial involvement); Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B.
at 703. 65 L.R.R.M. at 1626 (actions of elected officials attributed to employer); Wahoo
Packing Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 174, 63 L.R.R.M. 1290 (1966) (actions of company president's
family attributed to employer); Poray, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 697, 63 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1966) (actions of police attributed to employer); Balboa Pacific Corp., 156 N.L.R.B. at 1466, 61
L.R.R.M. at 1258 (actions of clergymen attributed to employer); Universal Mfg. Co., 156
N.L.R.B. at 1459, 61 L.R.R.M. at 1258 (offending news articles attributed to employer based
on agency theory); James Lees & Sons Co., 130 N.L.R.B. at 290, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1285 (actions of Chamber of Commerce held attributable to employer).
244. See, e.g., Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d at 1206; NLRB v. General Metal
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these cases it is doubtful that the employees ever acquire knowledge that
the list had been so delivered. Nevertheless, when such a list is delivered,
the Board will usually find the agency relationship. If the third party
utilizes the list in a manner to coerce employees, both the agent and the
employer will be held liable. In other cases, the agency relationship has
been found to exist when the employer publicly aligns himself with the
third party, such as by attending a dinner at which a coercive speech is
2
given by the agent. "
The manifestation of agency authority may also be found by the Board
in an employer's failure to act when the facts are such as to give rise to a
duty to disavow the coercive statements or actions of outsiders. This duty
will usually be found when the coercive activity is notorious and when the
employer actually has knowledge of its occurrence.2" 6
In sum, the Board's standards for attributing liability to employers for
the conduct of third persons are quite divergent from those developed at
common law. The legislative history of the agency provisions of the Act
clearly indicates that Congress wanted the Board to incorporate the
stricter common law standards into its factual analyses before holding
that an employer was liable for any third party action committed in the
employer's interest. Nevertheless, the Board and the courts have continued to apply the standards iterated by the Supreme Court in the preTaft-Hartley era. In selectively reading the legislative history rather than
examining it in its entirety, the Board has moved in quite the opposite
direction from that which was intended by Congress. It appears that so
long as the employer has actual control, or an opportunity to control the
coercive effects of third parties' anti-union conduct, either by preventing
them or by effectively disavowing them before his employees, the Board
and courts will require him to do so.
V.

CONCLUSION

With increasing competition between communities for capital investment dollars, it can no longer be denied that local business, political, and
civic leaders have genuine interests in the labor relations of employers
within the community. It is likely that in defense of those interests, they
will seek to exclude the intrusions of unions which, they rightly feel, will
endanger their ability to compete. Neither the Wagner nor the Taft-Hart-

Prods. Co., 410 F.2d at 473; NLRB v. Lake Butler Apparel Co., 392 F.2d at 76.
245. See, e.g., Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. at 703, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1626.
246. See, e.g., Richlands Textile, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 615, 90 L.R.R.M. 1391 (1975).
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ley Acts give adequate recognition to these interests. Thus, it has been
left to the Board and the courts to resolve the conflicts which arise when
the legitimate right of a community to protect and enhance its attractiveness for new industry collides with the legitimate rights of unions to seek
new members. The activity and statements that would normally amount
to objectionable conduct or unfair labor practices, if committed by an employer or his agent, may or may not result in objectionable conduct when
committed by non-agent third parties. The result in each case will depend
upon the level of coerciveness of the activity, and the extent to which that
coerciveness permeates the election environment. Usually this is a question of the degree of what was said, to whom, how often, and proximity of
the action to the election. The standards for judging conduct of non-agent
third parties are more liberal because of the assumption that those actions have a less coercive impact upon employees. Statements made by
parties and their agents, however, though judged by stricter standards in
election cases, are protected by the free speech provisions of the Act in
the context of unfair labor practice allegations.
The critical determination in cases involving third party actions or
statements is whether that party is an agent of the employer. While the
standards for determining the existence of an agency relationship provided by common law are definitive and allow for predictability, those
that have been developed by the Board and courts under the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts are sometimes more whimsical.
Thus, community members should be on notice that their response to
an organizing effort at a local industry will be closely scrutinized by the
Board and courts. If the actions of the community exceed the limits of
conduct permissible to the targeted employer, their actions can result in
the invalidation of any victory achieved by the employer in the election.
Moreover, the unsuccessful union will go to great lengths to impute liability for coercive actions of community members to the targeted employer.
If it is successful in imputing liability, and if the coerciveness is sufficiently prejudicial to the free exercise of employees' free choice, the
Board and courts may award the union a bargaining order in spite of its
election loss. Thus, community members may accomplish the very result
they sought to avoid by engaging in an anti-union campaign. Moreover, as
agents of the employer, the community members may themselves be subject to the remedial orders of the Board and the courts, resulting from
findings of unfair labor practices.
Appointed and elected civic officials, business leaders, and interested
citizens would be well advised to exercise the same caution and proceed
with the same degree of care as the targeted employer himself. The freedom of the election process can indeed be enhanced by their active involvement in the information process that creates an informed electorate.
However, the hazards accompanying their unbridled pursuit of their election goals are grave.
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Appendix
The Nature of the Interests
I.

THE COMMUNITY'S INTEREST

In spite of the apotheosis of the union movement which was attempted by the Wagner
Act,A the forty-six years which have elapsed since its passage have not seen organized labor
winning overwhelming support in the minds of most employers. Most often, the businessman associates the prospect of unionization of his employees with a drop in employee loyalty, lower productivity, imposition of inflexible work rules, wasteful work practices or featherbedding, and demands for excessive wages and benefits.Al This amounts to a higher
production cost and either lower profitability of his enterprise or a weakening of his competitive position in the market for his products.
A recent poll conducted by the Gallup Poll Organization on behalf of the Wall Street
Journal ^ 3 questioned 782 executive officers of corporations concerning their attitudes about
unions. The poll included 282 of the nation's largest corporations (including 102 of the "Fortune 500" companies), 300 medium-sized firms, and 200 smaller concerns. The most frequently cited negative effects and the percentage of respondents reciting those effects are
given in Table I.
Table IA
Effects

Large
Firms

Medium
Firms

Small
Firms

Reduced Productivity

26%

23%

14%

Inflexible Work Rules

17%

12%

7%

Excessive Wage Benefits

15%

12%

19%

Reduced Company Loyalty

13%

12%

5%

Higher Prices

12%

18%

31%

The attendant evils worked upon industry by labor organizations may be real or imagined.
Nevertheless, the reaction of corporate planners to union saturation of a labor market is
real. The more heavily unionized a community is, the less likely it is to attract new capital
for establishing manufacturing or distribution facilities.
The importance of a community's maintaining its union-free status for expansion of its
industrial base is evident from two recent studies of the relative attractiveness of states to
new business capital investment. The first study, A8 conducted by the Fantus Company, Inc.
(a consultant firm specializing in plant relocation questions) in 1975, ranked the ten states

Al. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §j 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griltin) Act of t959, Pub. L. No. 257, 73 Stat. 519. A final amendment was the Act of
July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent references will be to the "NLRA" or the "Act."
A2. Allen, Bosses Say Unions Do More Bad Than Good, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1980, at 29, col. 6.
A3. Id. Not all comments were negative. Ten percent of the respondents in large and medium sized firms mentioned
improvements in employee communications and efforts by union leaders to solve mutual problems with management.
Some cited gains in productivity and better training programs conducted by unions.
A4. Id.
A5. Fantus Co., A Study of the Business Climate of the States (Aug., 1975), reprinted in BACKGROUNDEa No. 29,
Unionization of the Textile Industry: A Case Study of J.P. Stevens, August 3, 1977, at 4 (hereinafter cited as the Fantus
Study].

1981]

735

COMMUNITY DEFENSE OF UNION

having the "most favorable business climates" and hence the greatest attractiveness for
plant relocations. These were Texas, Alabama, Virginia, South Dakota, South Carolina,
North Carolina, Florida, Arkansas, Indiana and Utah. The rankings were based upon a combination of factors, including the states' regulatory and legislative environments, state taxes,
business programs, and labor environment. Of these ten states,
all except one have right to
^
work laws which tend to check union growth and power.A
The Fantus study also ranked the states as to the ten least attractive for location of new
plant facilities. In order of their rank, they are Washington, Oregon, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Massachusetts, California and New York. These
states are among the most unionized in the nation.A' None of these states has right to work
laws.
A. more recent study, compiled by Alexander Grant & Company, Certified Public Accountants, for the Conference of State Manufacturers' Associations (COSMA), showed parallel results. This report of the business climates of the forty-eight contiguous states judged
each state according to a set of eighteen pre-selected criteria which were weighted in importance in accordance with the number of votes received by each on a questionnaire distributed to the thirty-nine state associations comprising COSMA.A Those criteria, in descending order of importance according to the aggregate of votes received, are included in Table
II.
Table IIA
Factor
State and Local Taxes
*Average Weekly Manufacturing Wage

Number of Votes
24
24

*Labor Union Membership as a Percentage of Total NonAgricultural Labor
*Workmen's Compensation Insurance Per $100 on Manufacturing

23

Occupations
*Unemployment Compensation Benefits Paid for Covered Worker

20
19

*Days Lost Because of Work Stoppages as Compared to Number
of Workers
Energy Cost Per Million B.T.U.'s
State Spending vs. State Income Growth
*Maximum Benefit for Disability Under Workmen's

18
18
16

Compensation Insurance for Average Manufacturing Wage
Earner

10

Private Pollution Abatement as Compared to Value of Industrial
Shipments

10

State Spending Per Capita
Percentage Change in State and Local Taxes Per Capita

9
19

A6. Indiana is the exception.
A7. See BURRAu OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATtSTICAL ABSTRACT oF THE UNITED STATES 427 (1979).
As. Questionnaires were distributed to the thirty-nine member organizations comprising COSMA. Each was asked to
select the eight factors from a list of eighteen preselected by COSMA. Thirty-one organizations responded. Alexander
Grant & Co., Certified Public Accountants, A Study of Business Climates of the Forty-Eight Contiguous States of America
[hereinafter cited as the COSMA Study]. See note A5 supra.
A9. Id.
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Percentage Change in Energy Costs Per Million B.T.U.'s

9

Manufacturers' Pollution Abatement Expenditures Per Capita
Amount of State Debt Per Capita
Percentage Change in Per Capita State Debt
*Viability (i.e., Net Worth) of State Unemployment
Compensation Trust Fund Per Covered Worker
Vocational Education Spending Per Capita

The significance of this list is its demonstration of the relative importance of a community's labor climate in the hierarchy of values examined in a manufacturer's location-decision-making process. Seven of the eighteen factors (indicated by asterisks)-five of the upper third-are labor-related. Half of the upper third of the list is at least indirectly related
to the degree of unionization of the community's work force.A"O
Based on the percentage of the total non-agricultural labor force represented by union,
the most heavily unionized communities are found in the states listed in Table III.
Table

State

111 "II

Percentage of Total Labor Unionized

Michigan

38.4%

West Virginia

38.2%

New York

38.0%

Pennsylvania

37.5%

Washington

36.7%

Illinois

34.9%

Ohio

33.2%

Indiana

33.2%

Missouri

32.3%

Wisconsin

28.7%

The least heavily unionized communities, on the other hand, are found primarily in the
South and Southwest United States, the "Sun Belt" states. These are listed in Table IV.

A10. Signigicantly, New York and Rhode Island, which pay unemployment compensation to striking employees (in.
creasing unions' strength) ranked 46th and 34th respectively in "overall desirability." New Jersey, which pays welfare
benefits to strikers ranked 47th. See Super Tire Eng'r Co. v. McCorckle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977) (challenge to New Jersey's payment of welfare benefits to strikers rejected).
All. BuREAu or T CEssus, U.S. DE'T or CoMsRc, STATISTICAL
ABsTRAcT, 1977, reprinted in COSMA Study, Exhibit II, Factor No. 2.
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Table IVA,,

State

Percentage of Total Labor Unionized
6.9%

North Carolina
South Carolina

8.0%

South Dakota

11.0%

Mississippi

12.0%

Florida

12.5%

Texas

13.0%

Virginia

13.8%

Kansas

14.1%

New Mexico

14.1%

Georgia

14.5%

By isolating the "unionization" factor as a barometer for predicting the growth or decline
of a community's industrial base, it can be anticipated that those states with lower concentrations of unionized labor pools should attract more industry than those states with higher
concentrations. This was generally borne out by the actual experience of the states in attracting (or losing) jobs during the ten year period between 1968 and 1978. In most of the
more heavily unionized states, the labor force either registered a net loss in jobs, or grew at
a smaller rate than the least unionized states.""a
14

Table VA
State

Gained (or Lost)

Michigan

(Lost) 3,200 jobs

West Virginia

(Lost) 5,200 jobs

New York

(Lost) 388,800 jobs

Pennsylvania

(Lost) 193,300 jobs

Washington

Gained 9,900 jobs

Illinois

(Lost) 140,500 jobs

Ohio

(Lost) 45,700 jobs

Indiana

Gained 21,400 jobs

Missouri

(Lost) 7,800 jobs

Wisconsin

Gained 57,800 jobs

In the least unionized states, however, the opposite trend was evident.

A12. Id.
A13. Obviously, a manufacturer must consider other factors in addition to the community's labor relations climate; for
example, availability of raw materials, proximity to markets, availability of specialized skills, cultural and educational
opportunities. The COSMA report did not, however, consider these factors.
A14. BuREAu or LAaoR STATiSTIcs, U.S. Dap'T Or LASOR, ETAaLISHMENT DATA, STATE AND AREA EMPLOYMENT, reprinted in COSMA Study, Exhibit 1; and Exhibit I, Factor No. 1.
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Table VIAL

STATE

GAINED (OR LOST)

North Carolina
South Carolina
South Dakota
Mississippi
Florida
Texas
Virginia
Kansas
New Mexico
Georgia

Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained
Gained

112,300 jobs
60,500 jobs
800,100 jobs
60,300 jobs
95,500 jobs
243,600 jobs
49,400 jobs
38,300 jobs
16,600 jobs
55,200 jobs

The states determined by COSMA to be "most attractive" were Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina,
Utah, New Mexico, Arkansas, Georgia, Oklahoma, South Dakota and
l a
Virginia.A
The ten states considered to be "least attractive" for investment purposes according to
COSMA were (in descending order of attractiveness): Oregon, West Virginia, Illinois, Delaware, Washington, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, New Jersey and Michigan.
The COSMA and Fantus studies generally support the thesis that as unionization of a
community increases, the community becomes a less attractive environment for capital investment. The empirical validity of the theoretical assumptions upon which the reports'
conclusions are based is of little importance for the purposes of this article, except insofar as
the reports supply a measure of legitimacy to the perceptions of private and public leaders
concerning leaders in their communities. In effect, both reports are likely to stiffen the resistance of political and private leaders in non-union enclaves to any influx of union
organizers.
The perceptions of political leaders generally parallel those negative impressions of private businessmen. Each of the two elements in the community has a distinct, but common,
need for insuring the expansion of the community's economy.
Public officials grow increasingly apprehensive as they are faced with the "Proposition 13
syndrome." They recognize that the spiralling tax rates and declining levels of public services have hastened the political demise of many of their colleagues. At the same time,
however, they are subject to increasing inflationary pressures upon their community's public
coffers. Unable to raise tax rates any further, the sole means of increasing revenues necessary for maintaining and improving essential governmental services (which is politically viable) appears to be through expansion of the existing tax base-by attracting new industries
to the community with their accompanying infusions of income and population.
The same inflationary pressures confront private businessmen in the community. The
A15. Id.
Als. The COSMA researchers assigned a weighted value to each of the eighteen factors listed in Table II in text
accompanying note A9 supra. They examined the most recent statistics available in order to arrive at rankings in terms of
each state's relative strength or weakness 'in that aspect or "factor," when compared to the other forty-seven contiguous
states. Through an undisclosed mathematical formula, the study developed an overall or "bottom-line" ranking, similar to
that of the earlier Fantus study, of the state's attractiveness to new business capital investment. There was a 70% correlation between the states labeled "moat attractive" in the COSMA and Fantus studies. There was a 60% correlation in the
states labeled "least attractive." Seven of the ten "most attractive" states on the COSMA study are also among the ten
states least unionized. Seven of the states labeled "least attractive" are also among the ten states most heavily unionized.
See Table IV in text accompanying note A12 supra.
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limited potential for market retention after price increase requires them to expand their
sales in order to meet their increased costs resulting from the inflationary spiral. To these
individuals, the arrival of new industry within the community means an increase both in the
buying power and in the number of potential customers for their goods and services.
To both the public and the private parties to whom new industrialization is seen as vital
to their very survival, anything that endangers the community's ability to expand by attracting new capital is perceived as a common threat. For this reason, the public and private
interests often form alliances through industrial development authorities and Chambers of
Commerce in which their common interests can be cooperatively pursued. These bodies are
thus imbued with both public and private characteristics. In light of the evidence discussed
herein, it is not surprising that public officials, private businessmen, and their allied organizations react vigorously when they perceive a threat to their communities' attractiveness for
new capital investment.

II. THE TARGETED EMPLOYER'S INTERESTS
Regardless of the interests of a community's public or private business elements, the interests of an individual employer whose employees will ultimately decide the issue of unionization are not always at one with the community's interests. As noted in the Wall Street
Journal-Gallup Poll, a significant minority of company executives whose employees are
presently unionized are either resigned (however begrudgingly) to the expansion of union
representation of their employees, or are altogether indifferent to the issue. Some corporate
executives foresee some benefit that the corporation can derive from its acquiescence in a
union's organizational drive. Others hold out the potential for non-resistance to a union
campaign as a "bargaining chip" with the unions at their organized plants.I7 In addition, an
increasing number of companies, particularly those in the automotive and rubber industries,
have entered into "neutrality agreements" with the unions representing their employees at
their northern plants.
Neutrality clauses are of recent vintage. The United Auto Workers Union (UAW) won the
first such clause in its 1976 contract negotiations with the General Motors Corporation.la
This was followed in 1979 by the contract between Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company and
the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastics Workers Union (URW). The URW contract has become the standard for the rubber industry, so that all major tire manufacturers,
with the exception of Goodyear, have entered into agreements containing language similar
to Goodrich's neutrality provision:
In situations where the URW seeks to organize production and maintanence employees in a plant in which a major product is tires and which is not presently
represented by a union, Goodrich management or its agent will neither discourage
nor encourage the Union's efforts to organize these employees, but will observe a
posture of strict neutrality in these matters.a
In various forms, neutrality clauses usually require an employer to refrain from making
statements in any form or taking any action that will tend to discourage employee interest
in joining the union. Some clauses require more, as in the 1979 agreement between General
Motors and the UAW, which required, in addition to neutrality, preferential treatment of
employees in the unionized plants permitting them to transfer-with full seniority
rights-to newly opened plants in the non-unionized South and Southwest.' O While some

A17. For example, some companies negotiate "neutrality pledges" in their collective bargaining agreements. See text
accompanying notes A19-A28 supra.
AI8. Kramer, Labor Law Neutrality Agreements, Daily Lab. Rep., October 29, 1980, at D-1.
A19. Id.
A20. Id.
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union leaders maintain that all neutrality pacts require the maintenance of a "zone of corporate silence,"As' some clauses specifically permit an employer to make "neutral" remarks,
in order to correct misstatements of fact concerning the union, the company, or the effects
of unionization upon the employees. Absent very specific language to the contrary, it is
likely that the courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) would
favor the latter interpretation of neutrality clauses, in light of the congressional policy, evidenced in section 8(c) of the Labor Management Relations ActAs2 favoring the free exchange
of ideas in campaigns. This interpretation is consistent with most Board pronouncendients
requiring a party to meet a heavy burden of proof when it is alleged that the other party has
ss
waived statutory or constitutionally protected rights.A
Contentions concerning the consistency of such clauses with the national labor policy notwithstanding, such a clause has been enforced in at least one federal court in the Northern
District of Ohio.Al4 Judge Young issued a decision enjoining the Dana Corporation from
making any anti-union or anti-UAW statements (written or oral) or from otherwise departing from Dana's contractually-required position of neutrality regarding an impending NLRB
election at its Gastonia, North Carolina facility. The judge's order also mandated that the
company remove all anti-union or anti-UAW posters from its bulletin board, while the
union and company submitted the case to expedited arbitration. Shortly afterwards, a company official proceeded to make a speech, inveighing against the union to plant employees.
Dana was cited for contempt of Judge Young's previous order and ordered to:
1. Communicate in writing with its employees in a form satisfactory to the UAW
wherein it repudiated all written and oral statements against the union; promising
to fulfill the requirements of the neutrality clause; and indicating its neutrality in
the pending NLRB election.
2. Provide union organizers an opportunity to address the assembled employees
on each shift for the same period of time that had been used by the Company
official and in his presence; and
3. Tear all anti-union bulletins from Company bulletin boards while the Company provided the union at least one-half of all the space on the boards and daily
access to the bulletin boards in order that the union could post its own notices
and review all other materials posted.A25
The peril in which an employer finds himself after becoming (often through a parent corporation) bound to such a clause is evident from the draconian severity of the judge's contempt order. It is likely that Dana's negotiators (however naively) assumed that the UAW
neutrality clause to which the company was binding itself required no more than the company was already doing through its adherence to a policy of "enlightened" labor-management relations. Yet, when the relatively innocent company's managers pursued a course
that, in other circumstances, might be considered perfectly legitimate management
campaigning, they were virtually bludgeoned with a contempt order granting a remedy the
likes of which had previously been reserved only for the most "notorious[ly] recidivist" of
labor law violators.A
As more unions are able to extract neutrality clauses from northern employers' new facilities in non-union communities, the lessons of Dana will be even more alarming to community leaders. They will generate even higher levels of community vigilance in defense of the

A21. Id. at D-3.
A22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). See Kramer, supra note A18, at D-2.
A23. Gary Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 744, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210, 1213 (1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
A24. UAW v. Dana Corp., 104 L.R.R.M. 2687 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
A25. Kramer, supra note A18,at D-4.
A26. Bartosic and Lanoff, Escalating the Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CFH.L. REv. 255, 256 n.4
(1972). See also NLRB v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 562 F.2d 8,13, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978).
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community's pristine, union-free, status. If the targeted employer is to be gagged and thus
silenced by his fear of becoming subject to the similar draconian strictures, the community
spokesman will be the only voice to balance the propaganda of the union apologists. And, if
the silence of the targeted employer can thus be bought and insured by unions through the
negotiating process, it may well be essential for the maintenance of the uncoerced, reasoned,
and thoughtful free choice which our national labor policies guarantee to employeesA27 that
the community spokesmen lead the debate against unionism in spite of the desires of the
targeted employer. As the Supreme Court has suggested in a somewhat analogous context,
free choice is best exercised in an informed state of mind which allows the individual to
perceive his own best interests.A28 Thus the interests of the private businessman and public
officials are not only distinct from one another's, as well as from that of the targeted employer, they may even be at odds with that of the targeted employer.

A27.
A28.

Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1534 (1962).
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).

